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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ROBUST FAULT DIAGNOSIS
OF PHYSICAL SYSTEMS IN OPERATION
by KATHY HAMILTON ABBOTT, Ph.D.
Dissertation Director: Professor Louis Steinberg
This thesis presents and demonstrates ideas for improved robustness in diagnostic
prol)lem solving of complex physical systems in operation, or operative diagnosis. The
first idea is that graceful degradation can be viewed as reasoning at higher levels of
a.bstraction (l(_ss detail) wh(,ncver the more detailed levels prove to be incomplete o1'
inadeqnate. A form of abstraction is defi_led that appli(,s this view to the problem
of diagnosis. In this form of abstraction, named status abstraction, we define two
levels. The lower level of abstraction corresponds to the level of detail at which most
current knowledge-based diagnosis systems reason. At the higher level, this thesis
presol_ts a graph representation that describes the, real-world physical system. Th(,
thesis demonstrates an incremental, constructive approach to manipulating this graph
representation that supports certain characteristics of operative diagnosis. We show
the suitability of this constructive approach for diagnosing fault propagation behavior
over time, and for sometimes diagnosing systems with feedback. We also show a way to
represent different semantics in the same type of graph representation to characterize
differeztt types of fault propagation behavior. We demonstrate an approach that treats
these different behaviors as different fault classes, and the approach moves to other

classeswhenpreviousclassesfail to generatesuitablehypotheses.
Theseideasareimplementedin a computerprogramnamedDraphys(Diagnostic
ReasoningAbout Physical Systems) a.nd d(_monstratcd for the (Ioma.in of inflight aircraft
subsystems, specifically a propulsion system (containing two turbofan engines and a fuel
system) and hydraulic subsystem.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Diagnosis of complex physical systems can be a difficult business, and automation of
this diagnostic process for real-world physical systems must address many important
issues. One particularly important issue is robustness, or the ability to reazon about
a variety of faults in a reasonable way, including the ability to degrade gracefully in
response to unanticipated inputs. Another important issue is ability to reason about
fault behavior in complez physical systems, including feedback and fault propagation.
This thesis research addresses aspects of both of these issues. In particular, the research
is concerned with diagnosis of complex physical systems in operation, or operative
diagnosis.
Robustness is important because a diagnostic system cannot be designed to specif-
ically anticipate every possible fault situation. Such situations are inevitable, because
the number of ways a complex system can fail is so large, and our ability to identify
every possibility in detail is limited. One goal of the research is to identify and ex-
plore ideas for achieving robust problem solving behavior in diagnosis in general, and
operative diagnosis in particular.
Fault behavior in physical systems can be complex in many ways. One such way
is that a single initial fault can have multiple consequences. In operating physical
systems, this set of consequences can increase as time passes and the effect of the fault
propagates. These systems are often very interconnected and have feedback, making
the fault propagation behavior more complex. Therefore, another goal of the research
is to explore ways to diagnose such systems while in operation.
The research explores these issues in the domain of non-digital devices. In particular,
2the approach is implemented for an aircraft propulsion system (including two turbofan
engines and a fuel subsystem) and hydraulic system in a computer program cMled
Draphys (Diagnostic Reasoning About Physical Systems).
The following sections contain a description of the problems addressed by the thesis
research. Current approaches to these problems are discussed, then the specific con-
tributions of this thesis research are presented. The assumptions on which the work is
based axe summarized and an overview of the thesis is given.
1.1 The Problem: Diagnosis of Complex Physical Systems
Diagnosis is the process of determining why some object is not behaving as it should.
Diagnosis of complex physical systems presents particular challenges, some of which are
addressed by this thesis research. We identify these challenges below, first examining
diagnosis of complex systems in general, then the additional issues associated with
operative diagnosis. We then discuss robustness. Robustness in problem solving means
the ability to handle a variety of inputs in a reasonable way, even if the inputs have
never before been encountered. This thesis addresses two aspects of robust problem
solving in diagnosis: graceful degradation and multiple classes of faults.
Before we describe these challenges of diagnosing complex physical systems, it is
appropriate to define some of the basic terminology used throughout the thesis. A
physical system (or just system) is the object being diagnosed; e.g., a human body or
an aircraft engine. A device or artifact is a physical system that was designed and
built by humans. A component is some piece of the physical system; e.g., an engine is
a component of an aircraft. Components may be made up of subpaxts which are also
components; for example, the engine is made up of the fan, compressor, combustor,
and other components. A .fault in a component is something that has broken or gone
wrong with that component; e.g., a fuel line leak (although the description of what is
wrong with a component can be provided at varying levels of detail). Behavior is what
the system does, usually in the form of parameter values that describe various aspects
of operation; e.g., oil temperature or pressure. A symptom is a discrepancy between
expected normal behavior and actual behavior.
1.1.1 Challenges of Diagnosing Complex Physical Systems
Complex physical systems, especially continuous or analog systems, have characteristics
which can make diagnosing faults in them challenging. We address several of those chal-
lenges in this thesis, including multiple consequences of a single initial fault, especially
when the fault does not immediately propagate to all potentially affected components;
different manifestations of the same kind of fault; and having sensors which are not
optimally placed for diagnostic reasoning.
When a component in a physical system fails, the effect of the fault will propagate,
especially (but not necessarily exclusively) to components which normally depend on
the faulty component for their proper operation. This fault propagation results in
multiple consequences of a single failure, although all the propagation may not happen
immediately. Because the components are highly interconnected in physical systems
such as aircraft subsystems, the fault propagation can have many consequences. Since
many of these physical systems also contain feedback among the components and among
subsystems, the resulting behavior of the affected components can be difficult to predict.
Sometimes the affected components fail as a result of these faulty inputs, making the
diagnostic reasoning even more complex. It is desirable for the diagnostic reasoning
to identify those consequences, because corrective actions may be necessary. This is
especially true in operative diagnosis, as we discuss below.
Another challenge in diagnosing complex physical systems is that a particular fault
may manifest itself as many different behaviors. For example, turbine blades may break
off and cause damage in many ways, depending on how many blades separated from
the turbine disk, what other blades they damaged, and what other parts of the device
were physically damaged by the separated blades. Moreover, we cannot model the
behavior of the broken blades in any detail, because we cannot predict the way that the
blade(s)will bouncearound,nor canwepredict the aerodynamiceffectsof the break
on the blades,amongotherbehaviors.Becausethe brokenturbinebladecanmanifest
itself in somanydifferentways,the resultingsystembehaviormaydifferqualitatively
as well as quantitatively. The moredetailedtile descriptionof the fault, the more
differentbehaviorsarepossible.This multitudeof behaviorsmeansthat the mapping
from behaviorto faults isverycomplex.
Theplacementof sensorsthat providemeasurementsaboutthephysicalsystemmay
add additional complexityto the diagnosticprocess.Sensorsprovideinformationon
someaspectof systembehavior,but not necessarilyoperationalstatusof the compo-
nents.Forexample,in anaircraft fuel system,oftenthereis a fuel temperaturesensor.
A normalsensorreadingfor this sensordoesnot necessarilyindicatea normalopera-
tionalstatusof the fuellineto whichit isattached.In contrast,digital circuitsprovide
measurementsof the input or output of components.1 If the output of a componentis
incorrector symptomatic,onecanassumethat the componentis affectedby the fault,
if only becauseits input wasincorrect.It is importantto reasonabouttherelationship
of themeasurementso thesystembeingdiagnosedto understandwhatexactlyisbeing
measured.Otheraspectsof sensorplacementhat complicatethediagnosticreasoning
includeredundantsensors,sensorswhichare computed (for example, engine pressure
ratio is computed from two sensor readings), and lack of sensors on every component.
1.1.2 Operative Diagnosis
Operative diagnosis, or diagnosis of physical systems in operation, is a variant of diag-
nosis of non-operating systems (such as, maintenance diagnostics), as described in [19],
[50], [53], and as discussed below. Particularly important issues associated with opera-
tive diagnosis include: the information a fault hypothesis must contain, dynamic fault
propagation behavior which means that the diagnosis will take place while the fault
is still propagating, and limited testing for additional information. Although these
1This is generally true at the level of abstraction at which circuit behavior is usually examined.
last two issues can arise in maintenance diagnosis, they are particularly important in
operative diagnosis.
A factor which affects the information that a fault hypothesis contains is the pur-
pose for which the diagnosis is being done. In operative environments, the diagnosis
is done to facilitate continued operation of the system under consideration. Therefore,
the information contained in a hypothesis should support the choice of actions available
to support that continued, safe operation. An example of a type of information that
could prove useful in an operative environments is the paths of interaction in the device
along which the fault is propagating. Knowing the propagation path might lead a hu-
man operator to prefer certain actions to prevent further fault propagation. Moreover,
identifying the effects of the fault can be important, because it is often necessary to take
corrective actions to compensate for the failure's effects, even if affected components
are not physically broken. For example, an airplane engine provides power for one of
the electrical generators. If the airplane engine fails, the generator will stop running,
even though there is nothing physically wrong with the generator itself. Action must be
taken to compensate for the lack of power, so the operator must know that the genera-
tor is no longer running. In another example, in medicine, the goal of the diagnostician
is to prescribe some medication or treatment. Often the symptoms and effects must be
treated as well as the disease itself, so knowing the disease Mone may not be sufficient.
Therefore, the information a hypothesis should contain for operative diagnosis should
include the cause of the fault, its effects (or system status), and the fault propagation
path.
In maintenance diagnosis, however, the purpose is to determine which part to fix
or replace. It is often sufficient to identify the source of the problem, but knowing how
the device is faulted, or the effects of the fault, might be unnecessary. For example,
in electronic troubleshooting, the purpose is usually to determine which part or com-
ponent to replace. In other domains, such as maintenance of mechanical devices, it
is often desirable to repair the part, so knowing what parts are physically affected by
the failure may be important. However, it is only necessary to know the parts that
arephysicallybroken,so in the example of tile electrical generator, it would not be
necessary for the maintenance diagnosti(:ian to repair the generator. As this example
shows, the information contained in a fault hypothesis for maintenance is different from
the information required for operative diagnosis.
Because of the information contained in a fault hypothesis for operative diagnosis,
some automated systems view diagnosis as the process of constructing a model or
explanation of the illness or fault, to account for both cause and effects (e.g., [41]).
Draphys belongs in this group of systems.
Dynamic behavior of the physical system may create other challenges in operative
diagnosis. In an operating physical system, the effect of the fault propagates and the
set of symptoms often changes as time (and the fault) progresses. This reflects the
characteristic of non-zero-time propagation, where not all effects of a fault happen im-
mediately. In maintenance, the diagnosis is usually done after all propagation has taken
place. In operative diagnosis, the propagation often will still be occurring while the di-
agnosis is performed. Therefore, the set of symptoms that must be used to diagnose
faults depends on when the sensor readings are sampled. Moreover, measurements are
usually sampled at predetermined intervals, and each time the sample is taken the set
of symptoms may change. The timing of these changes can be very difficult to predict,
since the time required for fault propagation depends on how the fault manifests it-
self. However, the changes in the set of symptoms reflecting fault propagation behavior
can be a very powerful means of discriminating hypotheses if the diagnostic process
knows how to use them. Most current diagnosis systems assume a static diagnosis
environment.
Even in maintenance diagnosis that takes place before all fault propagation happens
(which occurs much less often than in operative diagnosis), the diagnostic process stops
when the source of the fault is identified. In operative diagnosis, even when the fault has
been identified, the need for system status information requires the reasoning process
to continue to identify when components become affected by the fault.
Another issue associated with operative diagnosis is that the testing for additional
information is even more limited than in other types of diagnosis. In these other types
of diagnosis, measurements usually can be taken to provide discriminatory information,
although this type of testing may be costly. Ilowever, in operative diagnosis, any tests to
obtain additional information about the system's state are limited to those which do not
endanger the system's continued operation. This constraint means that the information
available to discriminate hypotheses is sometimes restricted. Tests can sometimes be
made by perturbing the physical system with known inputs and observing the resulting
behavior, but this must be cautiously done in a faulty system which must continue
operating. We assume in this research that the diagnosis must be accomplished with
the currently available sensor information.
Since fault hypotheses for operative diagnosis are distinguished by their cause, prop-
agation path and system status, the hypothesis space can be large. Considering multiple
types of fault propagation and multiple independent faults makes the space even larger.
Therefore, efficiency of exploring this hypothesis space is an important issue. This thesis
investigates ideas for efficient management of that hypothesis space by using knowledge
in the diagnostic process.
1.1.3 Robustness
Robustness in problem solving means the ability to handle a variety of inputs in a
reasonable way, even if the inputs have never before been encountered. This thesis
addresses two aspects of robust problem solving in diagnosis: graceful degradation and
multiple classes of faults.
Graceful Degradation
Diagnosis is the process of determining why some object is exhibiting abnormal behav-
ior. Many current approaches formulate this problem as the selection of an appropriate
solution from a previously enumerated set of possible solutions, where solutions are the
" ,'.s
identification of the fault. Choice of one of the solutions is determined by the abnormal
behavior of the system, which is often described as symptoms, or discrepancies between
expected normal behavior and the actual behavior of the system. These symptoms are
matched to the set of known faults based on knowledge about specific 2 fault-symptom
associations. However, when faults occur for which there is no associational knowledge,
approaches that depend on such knowledge are inadequate. These approaches degrade
precipitously, even if the variation of problem inputs is small A key point here, and
one which has been discussed extensively, is that attempting to describe in detail all
occurrences of how something can fail is futile [12]. It is futile because there is no way
to guarantee completeness.
A well-established approach to overcoming this precipitous behavior is to reason
about how the system works, rather than how the system fails [11], [13]. By using
models of normal system structure and behavior, and reasoning about discrepancies
between the actual system behavior and the model of normal behavior, faults can be
diagnosed that are not specifically described within the diagnosis system. As pointed
out in [11], a consequence of this reasoning is that one is trading breadth of fault
coverage in the model-based approach for specificity of the empirical associations. This
is a useful approach to achieving a certain amount of graceful degradation in diagnostic
problem solving.
This research expands on that notion, by exploring the idea that graceful degra-
dation can be achieved in a structured way by using abstraction. The basic idea is
that graceful degradation is not achieved by simply exploring whether something is
known about faults, but at what level of detail is it known. Knowledge at different
levels of specificity can provide different fault coverage, but increasing fault coverage is
achieved at the cost of degrading specificity. For example, if we know that the input
to a component is normal and the output of that component is abnormal, we can infer
2llere and throughout the thesis, when we referto specific fault-symptom knowledge, we are referring
to knowledge about how a system fails (e.g., fuel line leak) and symptoms that describe how a parameter
differs from its expected value (e.g., fuel flow high).
that the component is faulted in some way. IIowever, if we want to determine how the
component is abnormal, we need more specific information than just normal/abnormal.
Lacking that specific information, we may still be able to determine that the component
is broken, but we lose specificity of the fault hypothesis. In this thesis, a form of ab-
straction named status abstraction is presented and demonstrated to provide graceful
degradation.
Multiple Classes of Faults
Another aspect of robustness arises because not all faults can be diagnosed using the
same problem solving approach or the same knowledge. Simon discusses this issue for
problem solving of ill-structured problems, and talks about alternating among multiple
problem spaces as necessary [57]. Davis explores this issue for diagnostic problem
solving, by showing that different models of the physical system are useful for diagnosing
different kinds of faults I11]. These different models are useful because they represent
different types of adjacency, or different ways components can be "close," or "interact"
(e.g., components that interact electrically or magnetically).
The definition of fault categories is based on the kind of knowledge available to
diagnose the fault; in Davis' work, the kind of knowledge used was knowledge about
adjacency. This thesis builds on the idea that fault classes should be defined based on
adjacency, and adds the notion of specificity of available knowledge about the fault.
That is, we describe the type of paths of interaction followed by the fault (which are
based on functional or physical adjacency), and the level of detail of information about
the faulted component and what is being propagated. A less detailed description de-
scribes a component as being broken (e.g., fuel pump abnormal), with propagation
of abnormal status to fimctionally adjacent components. A more detailed hypothe-
sis would describe how the fuel pump is abnormal (e.g., clogged) and what abnormal
parameter values are propagated to adjacent components.
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1.2 Contributions
This thesis presents ideas for improved robustness in problem solving, and demonstrates
these ideas for diagnosis of complex physical system in operation. We summarize the
ideas below, then expand on each one.
° Graceful degradation can be viewed as reasoning at higher levels of abstraction
(less detail) whenever the more detailed levels prove to be incomplete or inade-
quate. A form of abstraction is defined that applies this view to the problem of
diagnosis. In this form of abstraction, named status abstraction, we define two
levels. The lower level of abstraction corresponds to the level of detail at which
most knowledge-based diagnosis systems reason.
2. At the higher abstraction level, this thesis presents a graph representation that de-
scribes the real-world physical system. The representation at the higher abstrac-
tion level is simple enough that reasoning can be done, yet not so abstract that
important characteristics are missing. The thesis demonstrates an incremental,
constructive approach to manipulating this graph representation that supports
certain characteristics of operative diagnosis. That is, we show the suitability of
the constructive approach for diagnosing fault propagation behavior over time.
We also show its suitability for diagnosing systems with feedback under some
circumstances.
3. We show a way to represent different semantics in the same graph representation
to characterize different types of real-world fault behavior, and we show a way
to compose hypotheses in a manner which corrcsponds to the way that these
different behaviors occur in the real world.
4. We demonstrate an approach that treats these different behaviors as different
fault classes, and the approach moves to other classes when previous classes fail
to generate suitable hypotheses.
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We now expand on each of these ideas.
1. Graceful degradation can be viewed as reasoning at higher levels
of abstraction (less detail) whenever the more detailed levels prove to be
incomplete or inadequate. A form of abstraction is defined that applies this view to
the problem of diagnosis. This form of abstraction is named status abstraction, because
the operational status of the components of the physical system is being abstracted.
It is useful for graceful degradation because less specific knowledge is needed at higher
levels of abstraction, although a correspondingly less specific hypothesis is generated.
This thesis explores two levels of status abstraction. At the higher level, component
operational status is described as either normal or abnormal. At the lower level, a more
specific description of the component's operational status is described. For example,
at the lower level, a hydraulic line might be described as "clogged." At the higher
abstraction level, the hydraulic line's operational status is abstracted to "abnormal."
Figure 1.1 shows this relationship for this and other examples. The lower level of
abstraction corresponds to the level of detail at which many current knowledge-based
diagnosis systems reason.
The choice of status abstraction was inspired mainly by discussions with diagnos-
ticians. If a major goal of the diagnostician is to select a remedial action to take in
response to the fault, the information should be generated to support that selection.
During the interviews of experts, they described default actions that they would take
if they did not recognize the fault or if there were multiple hypotheses. This action
was generally a conservative response to the fault. For example, if the pilot knew he
had a fan failure, but did not know how the fan was broken, he would shut down the
engine. However, if he knew it was icing, he would turn on the de-icing system. The
important point to notice is that he had an action associated with fan failures that
was (potentially) different from the action associated with the specific fan hypothesis.
Similarly, a doctor who can identify that a patient has a bacterial infection, but cannot
identify what kind of bacteria, will often prescribe a wide-spectrum antibiotic. If the
doctor is able to identify the bacteria, he may prescribe an antibiotic intended for that
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Figure 1.1: Levels of Component Status Abstraction.
particular type of bacteria. : :
Motivated by these and other examples, we characterize the hypotheses that the
diagnosticians used when they did not recognize the fault as being one which they
knew in detail. It appeared the diagnosticians were creating more general hypotheses
as they had less knowledge about the fault. For example, the doctor might recognize the
general characteristics of a bacterial infection, but might not have sufficiently detailed
knowledge to identify the specific type of bacteria. In the aircraft domain, these more
general hypotheses describe less specific information about the operational status of the
components in the physical system.
This form of abstraction is designed so that diagnostic reasoning falls back to the
higher level of abstraction when faults cannot be diagnosed specifically. At the higher
level, hypotheses are produced that identify what component is faulty, without iden-
tifying how the component is broken. Since we abstract the operational status of the
component, we named it status abstraction.
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Because the diagnostic reasoning at the higher abstraction level is designed to iden-
tify the component that is faulty, but not how it is faulty, the behavior used in the
diagnosis can be abstracted as well. We show that this abstraction is useful for graceful
degradation because less specific information about faulted system behavior is needed
to generate hypotheses. Although it is necessary at the lower level to identify how the
symptomatic sensor reading compares with its expected normal value (e.g., high or low),
it is not necessary to make this distinction at the higher level. It is only necessary to
identify that the value of the sensor is abnormal. This is also status abstraction, but it
is the parameter value status that is abstracted. Figure 1.2 illustrates the relationship.
This abstraction of behavior helps illustrate why this form of status abstraction
is useful as a means of coping with the complexity of the physical system's behavior.
Consider the example of a broken turbine blade. As mentioned earlier, we do not
know how to model many of the possible behaviors of a broken blade (or blades) in
any detail, because we do not know how the blade may bounce against other parts
of the system, nor do we know how to model the aerodynamics of broken blades in
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detail. This inability to provide detailed fault models for all possible manifestations
of broken turbine blades is the reason such an occurrence may appear to be a novel
fault. However, by modeling the behavior of the physical system at the higher level of
status abstraction, we do not have to model the behavior of the broken blade in any
detail. We merely have to identify that the component is abnormal, and identify the
propagation of abnormal status rather the propagation of specific parameter values.
In Draphys, the reasoning at the higher level of abstraction is a generate-and-test
process, although the definition of the abstraction levels is independent of the diagnostic
reasoning technique used at that level, and other techniques besides the one chosen could
be used. When symptoms first appear, the generator localizes the fault in a component
hierarchy, resulting in a set of candidate components that might be the source of the
problem. It then constructs fault hypotheses by simulating fault propagation from each
of the candidates. Each resulting hypothesis is tested to determine if it is valid; that
is, if it explains all the current symptoms. Often this generate-and-test process results
in multiple valid hypotheses.
The contribution here is the idea of using status abstraction as a framework for
supporting graceful degradation in diagnostic problem solving.
2. At the higher status abstraction level, we present a graph representa-
tion that describes the real-world physical system. The thesis demonstrates
an incremental, constructive approach to manipulate this graph representa-
tion that supports certain characteristics of operative diagnosis. The graph
representation describes the physical system as a collection of components and their
interconnections. The nodes in the graph represent the components, and the links
represent potential paths of interactions among the components.
We present an incremental, constructive diagnostic approach to manipulating the
graph representation that is suitable for diagnosing fault propagation behavior over
time, and for sometimes diagnosing systems with feedback. In operative diagnosis, new
symptoms often appear as time passes and the effect of a fault propagates. It is usually
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undesirableto wait until all symptomshaveappearedbeforeperforminga diagnosis,
sincecritical damage can occur that might have been prevented. In this approach,
we incrementally construct hypotheses by simulating fault propagation behavior. This
simulation involves traversal of the graph representation to reflect the propagation path
followed by the fault. We incrementally add to hypotheses created in previous time steps
by continuing the simulation. When new symptoms appear, the previously created
hypotheses are extended to account for the new symptoms. This is done by continuing
the simulation of propagation from the point where propagation had stopped previously.
An advantage to this approach is that it efficiently reasons about new symptoms when
they appear, rather than starting from scratch at each time step.
Another advantage is that this approach can sometimes diagnose systems with feed-
back. That is, given a subsystem with feedback that has several sensors, such as the
engine, not all sensors may reflect the fault's effect immediately. The sequence in which
the sensors become symptomatic may help identify the source of the fault. The diagnos-
tic approach presented in this thesis is designed to take advantage of the sequencing of
symptoms. Of course, if all sensors become symptomatic simultaneously, this approach
cannot distinguish where the problem began.
3. We show a way to represent different semantics in the same type
of graph representation to characterize different types of real-world fault
behavior, and we show a way to compose hypotheses in manner which cor-
responds to the way that these different behaviors occur in the real world.
Tile semantics referred to are different types of fault propagation behavior. The types
of fault propagation that we are concerned with are functional, which is propagation
along the normal, intended paths of interaction designed into the device, and physical,
which is fault propagation along unintended paths of interaction, but it occurs because
of physical adjacency of components. One consideration is that when physical prop-
agation occurs, functional propagation is also likely to follow, although the reverse is
not very likely. Therefore, certain combinations of these two types of fault propagation
behavior are more reasonable to expect than others. We can diagnose such complex
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fault behaviorby composing hypotheses which individually describe a single type of
propagation (either functional or physical) based on heuristics about fault propagation
behavior (e.g., functional propagation follows physical propagation).
Davis first presented the idea about adjacency in different models [11]; our con-
tribution is in using adjacency to look for particular types and combinations of fault
propagation behavior. This approach uses the hypotheses that were constructed for a
single type of fault propagation, so the composition process is efficient and straightfor-
ward. Also, the approach can easily be extended to accommodate other heuristics, such
as "physical propagation can follow functional propagation." This reasoning is at the
higher level of status abstraction, so we do not need to know how the physical damage
will specifically affect behavior.
4. We demonstrate an approach that treats these different fault propa-
gation behaviors as different fault classes, and the approach moves to new
classes when previous classes fail to generate suitable hypotheses. We de-
fine four single-fault classes, each of which is explored in turn when the previous ones
fail to diagnose the current symptoms. These fault classes are: (1) specific, function-
ally propagating faults (this class is the one in which Draphys groups known faults in
fault-symptom associations); (2) abstract, functional-propagation faults; (3) abstract,
physical-propagation faults; and (4) abstract, hybrid-propagation faults (these hypothe-
ses include both physical and functional propagation). The last class, describing mul-
tiple faults, is the final class that would be explored after the single fault classes fail
to produce acceptable hypotheses. This final class is not yet implemented in Draphys,
but most probably would be divided into subclasses describing different combinations
of differently-behaving multiple faults.
The order in which these classes are examined is shown by traversing the leaves of
the tree shown in Figure 1.3 from left to right. The leaves represent the fault classes,
and the nodes at higher levels in the tree represent the assumptions that must be true
for a fault to be a member of this fault class. The order in which these classes are
explored is based on likelihood of occurrence of a fault in that class.
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Figure 1.3: Hypothesis Space Partitioning
We consider this partitioning of the hypothesis space to be a ta_xonomy for diagnos-
tic problem solving, since it associates assumptions about the fault behavior with the
appropriate diagnostic problem solving techniques and physical system models. The
t_Lxonomy that is inq)lement(,d in l)r_phys is not exhaustive, but does provide a frame-
work for integrating new problem solving techniques into the overall diagnostic process.
At present, it does not include, for example, design errors, timing errors, or intermittent
faults.
A few points are worth making about these fault classes. First, they are similar
in several ways to the layered fault categories defined in [11]. They are ordered by
likelihood, a_d they are based on assumptions. Davis' work defined fault categories
i
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based on adjacency; this thesis research adds another dimension, that of abstraction
level. We claim that this contributes to increased robustness by supporting fault classes
at varying levels of specificity, each of which can be explored when previous classes fail
to generate hypotheses.
This notion of fault classes also contributes to efficient management of the hypoth-
esis space. By grouping the elements of the hypothesis space into these fault classes,
and reasoning about these fault classes in order of likelihood, the hypothesis space is
constructed and explored in an efficient, knowledge-directed manner.
1.3 Scope
The purpose of this section is to characterize the scope of the thesis in terms of the
assumptions made, the functionality of the diagnosis, and the implementation of the
ideas.
1.3.1 Assumptions
In this section, we describe the assumptions made in the design and operation of the
diagnostic reasoning. These assumptions include:
• We assume that we can predict normal behavior for every sensor reading available
to the diagnosis system, that we only have the sensors currently available in the
cockpit, and that sensor placement is fixed.
• Faults are not intermittent; that is, a component that becomes abnormal stays
abnormal.
• During the diagnostic process, no action is taken by the human operator that
corrects the problem while it is being diagnosed.
• Abnormality in sensor readings can be detected, and faults are not masked.
• The physical-system models are correct.
19
Sensor Readings
Aircraft I
I ontrolInputs
Monitor ]
Symptoms
Diagnosis
_ Faults
I .o, i I oo°j
_ Prognosis
] Interface I
Figure 1.4: Functional Diagram of the Fault Management Process
A major design concern is to identify a general description of the functions involved
when a human operator must manage faults, since diagnosis is only one of those func-
tions. We describe each of these functions, especially the monitoring that provides
inputs to the diagnosis function, to establish the context for discussion of the diagnosis
approach that this thesis presents.
1.3.2 Fault Monitoring, Diagnosis, and Response Generation
It is important to understand where the diagnostic process fits into the total hu-
man/machine system, concerning management of faults. Figure 1.4 depicts a genera/
functional diagram of the fault management process for a physical system in operation
with a human operator. Besides the human operator and the physical system itself,
there are four basic processes or functions that must be done: fault monitoring, fault
diagnosis, response generation, and user interface.
2O
The Fault Monitor
The physical system provides information to the fault monitor in the form of numerical
sensor information. The monitor is responsible for discrepancy detection, or detecting
when those sensor readings signify an abnormal situation. This detection of abnormal
behavior is done by comparing the actual behavior of the system under consideration
to the expected behavior of a healthy system under normal conditions. For physical
systems, the expected quantitative behavior can be generated using a quantitative
simulation model. Most quantitative simulation models of systems such as aircraft
engines are empirical representations of the normal behavior of the physical system.
Fortunately, such models are usually available for devices such as aircraft engines.
Figure 1.5 shows the fault monitoring process itself, which is implemented for the
aircraft subsystems as described in [52]. The input data to the monitor are the cur-
rent conditions (e.g., altitude, temperature), and control inputs (e.g., throttle setting).
Based on this information, the monitor runs the device model to simulate current ex-
pected, normal behavior in the form of quantitative simulated sensor values. When
the fault monitor detects a discrepancy between the actual and expected values, it
transforms the quantitative sensor reading to qualitative information in the qualitative
symptom.
The information contained in a qualitative symptom includes: the time the sensor
reading was taken; the qualitative value of the sensor reading; the status of that value
compared with the expected value (high or low); the qualitative value of the derivative;
the status of the derivative value compared with the expected value; and the steadiness
of the sensor reading. Both the reading and its derivative can take on qualitative values
of positive (+), zero (0), or negative (.)3. These refer to the instantaneous value of the
sensor reading or its derivative. The status of these values compared with the expected
values are derived from the sign of the error. If the error is positive, the status of the
ZSome values should never be negative (such as engine pressure ratio (EPR)), but even then, such
a sensor could malfunction and produce an erroneous negative reading.
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value is high. Similarly, if the error is negative, the value is low. The steadiness of the
signal can take on the value of stable or fluctuating.
In reality, it is not so straightforward to determine when a signal differs from its
expected value. Two major reasons for this are sensor noise and lack of model fidelity.
Both these issues, together with approaches for handling them, are discussed in detail
in [53]and [52].
Draphys assumes that allsensorscan be monitored at alltimes.Other monitoring
approaches addressthe problem of choosingwhich sensorstomonitor when not allcan
be processed[17],[18].
The Diagnostic Process
The output of the fault monitor is the set of symptoms at the current point in time.
The set of symptoms provide the input to the fault diagnostic process. The diagnostic
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process occurs in stages that correspond to the way humans described their diagnostic
reasoning. The first stage is diagnosis of specific, known, commonly occurring faults
by associational rules. This corresponds to the stimuh_s-response type of reaction that
human operators of physical devices are trained to have. It involves compiled knowledge
about the association between symptoms and faults, so that the operator response in
the presence of a known fault is rapid and efficient. IIowever, when novel faults occur,
this compiled knowledge is inadequate.
When novel situations occur, humans have been observed to revert to reasoning
about underlying domain principles [45]. For physical artifacts, this often involves
reasoning about a mental model of the device under consideration. We designed and
implemented an approach in this second stage that uses models of structure and be-
havior. The models used in this stage are qualitative, in contrast to the quantitative
model used by the fault monitor.
The first diagnosis stage corresponds to our lower level of status abstraction, and
the second stage corresponds to our higher level of status abstraction. The motivation
for the order in which abstraction levels are processed is based on observations of
human diagnostic reasoning. This differs from the typical use of abstraction levels
as exemplified by ABSTRIPS [48], where the processing is abstract-to-specific. We
discuss the motivation for our choice, and some possible consequences and alternatives,
in Chapter 4.
The output of the diagnostic process is a set of fault hypotheses. The information
contained in and associated with a hypothesis includes: the fault type, the cause or
source of the problem, the propagation path, and the system status. The fault type
is either single or multiple fault, where multiple fault refers to multiple independent
faults. The source is the physical component that is broken or the first one affected (e.g.
in a bird ingestion, the fan is the first component affected although there is nothing
physically wrong with it). The specific cause of the fault describes how a component
is broken. The propagation path describes the order and manner in which components
were affected. The system status describes the components affected by the fault and
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their operational status. At present, one way that component operational status is
designated is either definitely affected by the failure when symptom information justifies
it, or possibly affected when there is reason to believe that the component might be
affected but symptom information cannot confirm or refute it. We describe a hypothesis
produced by Draphys as valid if it accounts for exactly the current symptoms, that is,
if the component it identifies could have broken and resulted in the current symptoms.
That is, the hypothesis must form a covering set [46].
Response Generation and Operator Interface
The response generation process takes the fault hypotheses as input and identifies cor-
rective responses to the human operator. A rudimentary capability to generate re-
sponses is implemented, but more extensive work is outside of the scope of this thesis.
An advanced capability for taking the output of Draphys and generating responses is
being explored in [27].
Similarly, the human interface is rudimentary. There are many issues associated
with providing this information to the human operator, such as display formats for
presenting the information [3], and they are outside of the scope of this thesis.
1.3.3 Implementation
The diagnostic ideas presented in this thesis are implemented as part of an overall
fault management system called Faultfinder [1], [38]. Faultfinder, including Draphys,
is implemented on a Symbolics 3600 series computer in Symbolics Common LISP, us-
ing Flavors. The physical system implemented for the present version of Faultfinder
includes two Pratt and Whitney JT8D-7 turbofan engines, oil subsystems for each en-
gine, a fuel subsystem, and the hydraulic system for a Boeing 737 twin-engine transport
aircraft.
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1.3.4 Empirical Evaluation
The ideas presented in this thesis were tested by applying them to actual fault cases that
occurred in civil transport aircraft accidents that resulted in loss Of llfe and property,
and failure incidents that did not result in accidents. The set of accident cases was
divided into two subsets of equal size. The faults in the first set were used to develop
the diagnostic concepts and to identify the capability required to diagnose each real-life
situation. The second set of cases was set aside and not examined until the prototype
computer program was completed. Once Draphys was implemented, the second set
of test cases was reconstructed for evaluation. All the test cases were used to test
Draphys, with very promising results. Out of eight accident cases, Draphys successfully
diagnosed seven, and the eighth case was partially diagnosed. Details are described in
Chapter 6.
1.4 Guide to the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis expands on the ideas briefly summarized in this chapter.
Chapter 2 describes the aircraft subsystems being diagnosed and presents a series
of example faults that illustrate the scope of Draphys' diagnostic capability. These
examples describe what the diagnostic reasoning does rather than how it is done. The
details on how the diagnosis is done are described in later chapters.
Chapter 3 describes the reasoning about fault propagation behavior in known faults.
In particular, the reasoning about sequences of symptoms over time is presented. We
show that the reasoning described here is useful but not sufficient.
Chapter 4 discusses graceful degradation of the problem-solving process in the pres-
ence of novel faults as reasoning at higher levels of abstraction. The choice of abstracting
the information in specific hypotheses is discussed. Again, we show that the reasoning
here and the models are also useful, but not sufficient.
Chapter 5 describes the partitioning of the hypothesis space to accommodate the
multiple problem solving techniques and models needed. The different assumptions
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madeby the diagnosticprocess,the differentproblemsolversrequired,andthe tech-
niquesfor reasoningwith problemsolversandmodelsaredescribed.
Chapter6discussesanexperimentalevaluationof thediagnosticapproachonactual
fault cases.Each case and the resulting hypotheses are presented. An analysis of the
resulting successes and failure show that the diagnostic approach strongly depends on
the models of the physical system and the type of symptoms provided by the fault
monitor. The analysis also highlights the importance of the choice of abstraction level
for particular fault classes. An analytical evaluation is also presented, identifying the
aspects of the approach that are particularly important to its success. As part of the
analytical evaluation, we present a knowledge degradation analysis.
Chapter 7 concludes with a summary of the research contributions. Limitations of
the approach are summarized as well, with implications for future research.
The reader interested in knowing what the diagnostic approach does, without nec-
essarily knowing how it does it, should read Chapter 1, the overview, and Chapter 2,
the examples. The reader interested in more technical depth on any of the major issues
should read Chapters 3, 4, or 5, depending on their particular interest. Anyone with
a desire to thoroughly understand the technical details and how to apply them to a
specific problem should give particular attention to Chapter 6, especially the analytical
evaluation of the approach.
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Chapter 2
Diagnosis Examples
We describe here a series of examples that illustrates the diagnostic problem solving
process proposed in this thesis. The emphasis in this chapter is not on how the pro-
cess works but rather on what the process does and the variety of faults that can be
diagnosed.
We begin by describing the aircraft domain; in particular, we describe a turbofan
engine. We then present a series of examples, each illustrating some diagnostic capa-
bility of the thesis approach. The first example illustrates diagnosis of a known fault
using associative reasoning. Later examples illustrate diagnosis of novel faults, with
progressively complex propagation behavior.
2.1 The Aircraft Domain
To fully understand the examples, a short description of the application domain is
appropriate. The aircraft, a two-engine civil transport, contains hundreds of complex
components. We simplified the aircraft model for this research by only including two
major subsystems, the propulsion and hydraulics systems. This simplification allowed
us to address the complexities of fault diagnosis, including propagation and feedback,
without having to model the entire aircraft. The propulsion subsystem consists of
two turbofan engines and a fuel subsystem. The hydraulics system has two subsystems
that correspond to the control surface in each wing and the required hydraulics support.
Figure 2.1 shows the component hierarchy, where the links shown represent a subpart
relationship. A total of thirty-eight components make up the model. Twenty-eight
are primitive components that have no subparts, and the remainder are composite
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components. It is important to note that several of the primitive components are
sensors, whose purpose is to provide some type of information about system operation.
The examples shown here focus on engine faults. The type of aircraft engine chosen
was a turbofan engine, one commonly used on civil transport aircraft. Figure 2.2 shows
a schematic of the engine.
Its functioning is described here. The air enters the fan, a low-pressure compressor.
The fan compresses the air, which flows to the high-pressure compressor. There the air
is compressed further. It passes to the combustion section, which sprays fuel to mix
with the highly compressed air, and ignites them. Ignition increases the velocity and
temperature of the air, turning the turbines as the air flows to the exhaust section. The
turbine section is divided into two stages. These two stages are connected to the fan
and compressor with concentric shafts. The first turbine stage drives the compressor
and the second stage drives the fan.
The engine has five sensors whose readings provide the following parameter values:
• NI, N2, Fuel flow (FF), exhaust gas temperature (EGT), and engine pressure ratio
(EPR). The Nt and N2 sensors measure the rotational speeds of the fan and high-
pressure compressor, respectively. The fan and compressor generally rotate at different
speeds because they are connected to different turbine stages. Fuel flow measures the
rate at which the fuel is entering the engine. EGT is the exhaust gas temperature.
EPR is a ratio of the air pressure at the exhaust divided by the air pressure at the
engine inlet.
2.2 Diagnosing Known Faults
Suppose a turbine blade fails because of erosion. The initial symptoms will be fluctua-
tion in the sensors that measure characteristics of the turbine section, EPR and EGT.
This may be accompanied or followed by fluctuations in N1 and N2. Subsequently,
EGT will increase because energy is not being extracted properly by the turbines. Be-
cause the turbines are not operating properly, EPR will decrease. When this happens,
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N1 and N2 decrease.
Draphys diagnoses faults such as this by matching the sequence of symptoms that
occur with sequences associated with known faults. The associational rules express
temporal relationships among parameters as part of the conditions for rule satisfaction.
The rule for a turbine blade separation is stated in English paraphrase as "EPR and
EGT fluctuating is accompanied or followed by N1 and N2 fluctuating, EPR and EGT
fluctuating is also followed by EGT increasing and EPR decreasing. EGT increasing
and EPR decreasing are followed by N1 and N2 decreasing." Draphys will identify all
rules satisfied by the current set of symptoms.
2.3 Novel Fault Diagnosis, Functional Propagation
Suppose the fault is a fan failure. We describe it as a novel fault because how the
fan is failing is not described in detail in our associational knowledge, as our fan blade
3O
failure was in the previous section. In such a failure, the first sensor affected would
be the N_ sensor. Since the fan would not compress air properly, the effect of that
failure would propagate to the high-pressure compressor and thus to the N2 sensor.
It would then propagate to the combustor since the under-compressed air would not
ignite as efficiently. Therefore, the expanding gases resulting from combustion would
not turn the turbines as rapidly as they normally would. EGT and EPR would be
symptomatic to reflect this. Also, since the turbines would not be extracting energy,
the fan and compressor would not turn as fast since they derive some of their power
from the turbines. 1 Titus the faulty response would be perpetuated.
For this fault, suppose that the first symptom that Draphys detects is in N1. Since
N1 is an engine parameter, the second diagnosis stage, which performs diagnosis at the
higher abstraction level, is able to localize the fault to the engine subsystem. Each
component in the engine subsystem is then proposed as the responsible component or
source of the fault.
For each proposed responsible component, Draphys generates a fault hypothesis by
qualitatively simulating the fault propagation behavior. That is, it uses simulation to
determine the extent of the failure's effect. For example, in one hypothesis, Draphys
will propose the fan as the responsible component. Draphys reasons about a model of
the engine and its interconnections to determine tilat the high-pressure compressor and
the N1 sensor depend on the fan for their proper operation; that is, they functionally
depend on the fan. This knowledge is modeled in a graph representation that describes
the physical system as a collection of components and their interconnections. The
nodes in the graph represent the components, and the links represent the functional
dependencies among the components. Draphys then uses the same simulation process
from each remaining candidate component to construct the hypothesis corresponding
to that component.
J The fan and compressor would still be turning, because the air flow into the engine provides a
_windmilling" effect, even when the engine is not running. However, the aircraft must be moving
through the air for this _windmilling" to occur.
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Knowing these interconnections, Draphys then attempts to continue simulating the
propagation of the failure to functionally dependent components. In this example, it
checks whether the fault's effect in the actual system has reached the high-pressure com-
pressor. This is done by examining the symptoms to determine if N2 is symptomatic.
If it is, then the failure is assumed to affect the high-pressure compressor and Draphys
continues the process from there. If N2 is not symptomatic, as in this example, simu-
lated propagation halts on this path. Draphys then explores all remaining functional
propagation paths.
In this example, Draphys generates a set of valid hypotheses that has two distinct
possibilities for a responsible component. The first is that the fan is the source, and
the second is that the N1 sensor failed. A fault in either component could result in the
current symptoms. Figure 2.3 shows the hypotheses that result from a symptom in N1.
Note that these hypotheses describe what components are affected, but not how they
are affected, because the reasoning is being performed at the higher abstraction level.
Extending this example further, assume that a short time after the N1 symptom
was first detected, a symptom in N2 is also detected. Draphys then tries to extend the
propagation path of all the valid hypotheses to explain the new symptoms. These paths
are extended by continuing the qualitative simulation from the end of the propagation
path in the old hypotheses. For instance, in one valid hypothesis propagation stopped
at the fan, because the next component on this functional propagation path was the
high-pressure compressor. Since earlier there was no symptom in N2, and because we
could expect N2 to be abnormal if the compressor were abnormal (because we assume
that propagation between the compressor and the N2 sensor to be instantaneous),
Draphys assumed that the compressor was unaffected. Now that there is a symptom in
N2, Draphys updates the system status for this hypothesis and continues the simulated
propagation.
The resulting hypothesis, shown in Figure 2.4, accounts for all symptoms. It is the
only member of the set of old valid hypotheses that can do so. Draphys eliminates all
others because simulation could not extend them to account for the symptom in N2.
---- rz
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HYPOTHESIS 1 OF 2
Current Symptoms:
N1 Abnormal
Fault Type: Single Fault
Propagation Path And Component Status:
HYPOTHESIS 2 OF 2
Current Symptoms:
N1 Abnormal
Fault Type: Single Fault
Propagation Path And Component Status:
Propagation Type: Functional
ResponsibleComponent
DefinitelyAffected
Propagation Type: Functional
Figure 2.3: Valid IIypotheses Resulting From a Symptom in N1.
2.4 Novel Fault Diagnosis, Physical Propagation
Suppose that the fault was fan blade separation and that the fan blade broke off and
damaged a hydraulic line in the wing to which the engine was attached. Draphys detects
symptoms in N1 and in the hydraulic pressure sensor. Draphys cannot explain these
symptoms by simulating functional propagation, because thcre is no functional relation-
ship between them. t[owever, a physical proximity relationship does exist. Therefore,
by knowing that the fan is physically adjacent to the wing containing the hydraulic
line, Draphys can identify propagation from the engine to the wing. This knowledge is
contained in a graph representation similar to the representation of functional depen-
dencies, except that the links in the graph represent potential paths of fault propagation
that are due to physical proximity. Draphys uses a model of the physical propagation
to simulate this type of propagation.
Another hypothesis might be that there are two independent faults, one in the
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engine and one in the hydraulic system. Draphys does not describe the multiple fault,
because it uses a heuristic that it does not produce multiple-fault hypotheses when it
can produce valid single-fault hypotheses that account for the current symptoms.
2.5 Novel Fault Diagnosis, Hybrid Propagation
Once such a fan blade separation has caused damage in both the engine and in the
hydraulic system, the effect of the fault will propagate functionally in both subsystems.
The initial propagation was physical, but later propagation was functional. Therefore
models of both physical and functional structure are required to explain the current
fault behavior. Draphys handles this situation by composing the primitive hypotheses
that describe the propagation within a single model.
Suppose we have a fan blade failure, and resulting symptoms in N1, N2, and the hy-
draulic pressure sensor. The hypothesis Draphys generates for this example is presented
in Figure 2.5. It shows that the fan is the source of the problem, with physical prop-
agation to the hydraulic line, and functional propagation from the fan and hydraulic
to their functionally dependent components. This hypothesis is the composition of
three primitive hypotheses, where each primitive hypothesis describes a single type of
propagation. Each primitive hypothesis is outlined in the figure.
One primitive hypothesis represents the initial physical propagation from the fan to
the hydraulic line. Another primitive hypothesis represents the functional propagation
within the engine resulting from the broken fan, and the third primitive hypothesis
describes the functional propagation that resulted from the hydraulic line damage.
Continuing this example even further, suppose we now see symptoms in EPR and
EGT. The hypothesis shown in Figure 2.5 is extended by continuing simulation from
the point(s) in the propagation path where it stopped, resulting in the hypothesis shown
in Figure 2.6. Once propagation to the turbine is confirmed, the status of the combustor
is updated to "definitely affected," since the reasoning assumes that the fault would
not affect the turbine without affecting the combustor.
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HYPOTHESIS 1 OF 1
Current Symptoms:
N1 Abnormal
N2 Abnormal
Hydraulic Pressure Abnormal
Fault Type: Single Fault
Propagation Path And Component Status:
_._;.<.;_:_:::_. Functional Propagation
Physical Propagation
0 Responsible Component
6) Definitely Affected
0 Possibly Affected
__ii _i iiilii!iiiiiiiiiiiil'_ J ii i_il
ili_iiiiiilfiii!ii i_ iiii iiiiiii'l !iilii;i_ i i!iiii ii!!!ililiii
iii! iiiiil iiiiilii i!!i!iiiili;
! iiiii!iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii!iiiiiiiiiii:iii!i! ii!   l ,,iii ii:iii i!iiiiiii iiiiliiiiiiiiii!i!ii!i
Propagation Type: Hybrid
Figure 2.5: Composed Hypothesis With Physical and Functional Propagation.
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HYPOTHESIS 1 OF 1
Current Symptoms:
N1 Abnormal
N2 Abnormal
Hydraulic Pressure Abnormal
EPR Abnormal
EGT Abnormal
Fault Type: Single Fault
Propagation Path And Component Status:
Control Surfaces
_._:i:i:_.:_:._. Functional Propagation
• Responsible Component
_ _) Definitely Affected"_'::::::" _ Possibly Affected
Propagation Type: Hybrid
Figure 2.6: Hypothesis After Symptoms in EPR and EGT.
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2.6 Summary
In this chapter, we showed a set of increasingly complex fault situations. The initial
example was that of a known fault, or one for which we had specific knowledge about
how the component was faulty and the corresponding symptoms. The later examples
were complex in the following ways: the fault propagation behavior increased the set
of symptoms (and the corresponding consequences) as time progresses, and the fault
behaved in such a way that a single model was not sufficient to diagnose it.
/ .',
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Chapter 3
Diagnosing Known Faults Via Associational Knowledge
Fault propagation results in changes to symptoms as time and the effects of the fault
progress. In this chapter, we discuss reasoning about the patterns of symptoms over
time for known, commonly-occurring faults. We define known faults as faults about
which we have specific knowledge; that is, we have knowledge about how the faulty com-
ponent was broken (e.g., fuel pump clogged), and how the affected system parameters
differ from their expected values (e.g., fuel flow is high).
We should emphasize two points about this chapter and its contents. First, we
include the information in this chapter for completeness and to help clarify the rela-
tionship between known faults and novel faults, but techniques for diagnosing known
faults is not the primary focus of this research. Second, we used associational knowledge
in the diagnostic reasoning, but other techniques could have been used, as described
later in the chapter.
3.1 Associational Knowledge
The approach implemented ill Draphys for diagnosing known faults was to embed rea-
soning with temporal predicates into a rule-based system. The rules express the as-
sociation between a fault and a set of symptoms, and the symptoms' changes over
time.
The fault-symptom associations for the aircraft domain were obtained by interview-
ing domain experts (pilots and engine designers) and by examining actual fault cases.
The experts often described symptoms as a sequence of events over time. For exam-
ple, a foreign object ingestion was described by one pilot in the following way: "First
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performance values will fluctuate, then EGT and EPR will decrease." The sequence of
symptoms often helped distinguish among different fault hypotheses that had the same
initial symptoms.
To provide the capability of reasoning about sequences of symptoms over time,
a rule-based system was extended to permit temporal reasoning functions within the
rules in a knowledge base. The temporal functions permitted as part of the rules are
summarized in Table 3.1. These functions are the temporal functions developed by
James Allen [4].
As an example, the rule for a possible foreign object ingestion looks like:
( (foreign-obj ec¢)
(and
(equal
(equal
EPR fluctuating
EGT fluctuating)
EPR fluctuating
Fuelflow fluctuating)
(meets EPR fluctuating
EPR decreasing)
(meets EGT fluctuating
EGT decreasing)))
To paraphrase, this rule states that the hypothesis of foreign object is a possibility
when EPR, EGT, and Fuelflow are fluctuating simultaneously, EPR fluctuating is fol-
lowed immediately by EPR decreasing, and EGT fluctuating is followed immediately
by EGT decreasing. When this rule is fired, the intervals during which the parameters
have the qualitative values are tagged with the times during which they occur, and the
relationships between intervals are identified using those time tags.
To illustrate how the diagnosis is tailored to reason about dynamic behavior of the
4O
Table 3.1: Temporal Functions
Temporal Functions
Starts X Y
Finishes X Y
Before X Y
Overlaps X Y
Meets X Y
During X Y
Equal X Y
Temporal Functions
Explanation of Function
Intervals X and Y
begin at the same
time but X ends
before Y.
XXX
YYYYY
X and Y end at the same
time but X begins
after Y.
XXXX
YYYYYY
X is completed before Y
begins.
XXX YTY
X begins before Y begins
ends after Y starts,
but before Y ends.
XXXX
YYYYY
X ends at the same time
that Y begins.
XXXYYY
The time interval for X
is entirely contained
within Y's time interval.
XXX
YYYYY
X and Y occur during the
same time interval.
XXX
YYY
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physicalsystem, suppose we axegiven the followingsymptoms from the faultmonitor:
Signal Value Time
(EGT fluctuating 5)
(EPR fluctuating 6)
(Fuelflow fluctuating 6)
(EGT decreasing 12)
(EPR decreasing 14)
The symptoms are presented here in a compressed form, so that only the abnormal
aspects of the sensed values are shown. These symptoms represent the qualitative
value of the sensor error at the beginning of the time interval during which the value is
valid. Until a new qualitative value is generated by the fault monitor, this qualitative
value is assumed to hold. In the example presented above, EGT began fluctuating
at time 5 and continued to have that value until time 12. The fault monitor sends
qualitative symptoms to the diagnosis process at the beginning of a time interval, and
only sends another value for that sensor when the qualitative value changes. Thus the
interval during which a symptom's qualitative value holds is the interval used for Allen's
interval-based temporal logic. These symptoms satisfy the rule for the foreign object
ingestion described earlier.
Allen's temporal predicates were chosen because they are based on an interval-based
temporal logic. An interval-based representation was well-suited for representing the
sequences of symptoms, because the qualitative values of sensor data (e.g., EPR high)
generally hold over a time interval. Since we want to reason about the sequences of
qualitative values of the sensors, and not just the set of symptoms, we reason about
them based on the time intervals in which they hold.
Using dynamic information in this stage reflects the diagnostic reasoning described
by human experts in identifying known faults because it helps to distinguish among
-y
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faults which may have the same initial symptoms but different subsequent behavior. In
this application domain, there are several examples of such faults. Two such faults are
icing and foreign object ingestion, since both have initial symptoms of engine perfor-
mance values (EPR and EGT) fluctuating.
3.2 Difficulties With the Specific Associational Reasoning
The reasoning as described provides diagnostic capability to a degree, but it has some
difficulties. The difficulties essentially fall into two problem areas. The first prob-
lem area is that the choice of a rule-based representation leads to some difficulties in
reasoning about the fault propagation. The second area, which is independent of the
representation chosen, is the difficulty in getting the knowledge about faults and their
propagation behavior at this level of detail.
3.2.1 Limitations of The Rule-Based Representation
The temporal functions appear to be adequate for describing the types of temporal
relationship that occur, but the rule-based representation of fault behavior that we
use leads to some difficulty in reasoning about fault propagation. The major problem
arises when the rules are applied before the entire sequence of symptoms has occurred.
For example, if symptoms are detected and the diagnosis process is triggered while the
performance values are fluctuating, it may not be possible to distinguish yet between
icing and foreign object ingestion, since they both have the same initial symptoms.
Therefore, both hypotheses must be maintained. By using a rule-based representation
as described and implemented, the entire sequence of symptoms must take place before
the rule is satisfied, tIowever, it might be important to identify those fault hypotheses
whose initial temporal sequence is satisfied, even if subsequent symptoms have not yet
occurred.
Three approaches could be used to reason about fault propagation in a rule-based
representation: (1) have a separate rule for each possible propagation sequence (or
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extentof propagation) that could occur; (2) have each rule represent a separate prop-
agation step; or (3) change the inference strategy to deal with partial rule satisfaction.
Having a separate rule for each possible propagation sequence would require many
rules for each fault, where each rule would represent a sequence for a different extent of
propagation. Using this approach, the appropriate rule would be fired for a particular
instance of that fault at that point in time, corresponding to the propagation behavior
exhibited.
Each rule could represent a separate propagation step or a temporal change in the
sequence of symptoms for a fault. However, to reason about temporal relationship
among propagation steps for each fault, there would either have to be additional rules
for reasoning about the propagation-step rules, or a means for the rules to communicate
with each other about the possible interrelationships. As discussed in [14], rules are
best used when they do not need to communicate with each other and they represent
independent pieces of knowledge.
Another approach would be to change the inference strategy to allow rules to fire
when some symptoms have occurred that match at least one of the temporal predicates
in the antecedent, but other fault behavior described in that antecedent may not yet
have occurred. This is certainly a feasible approach, but the motivation for making
such a change would be to support reasoning about the behavior of the device as the
effect of the fault propagates. In essence, then, such a change would be made to support
simulation of that behavior. Although the augmented rule-based representation seemed
reasonable at first, we now know some of the representational difficulties that are not
completely overcome by using the temporal predicates.
These approaches for fixing the rule-based representation, while feasible, represent
fixes that are required because of the choice of representation. Another choice of rep-
resentation, such as a graph-based representation, may be more suited to supporting
the simulation of fault propagation behavior. The nodes would represent the quali-
tative symptoms and the links would represent the temporal relationships. Thus the
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graphwould represent a state-transition network, where the states are the qualitative
symptomatic sensor readings. Associated with the states might be the corresponding
components affected, so system status could be easily determined. Such a representa-
tion would be similar to the representation used by Pan [39], and augmented with the
temporal reasoning predicates defined by Allen.
The representation issue has potential consequences of awkwardness in characteriz-
ing the knowledge and in the reasoning. However, even considering the representation
issues resolved, another problem area exists which is independent of the representation:
the difficulty of getting the specific knowledge about faults and their behavior to put
into the representation.
3.2.2 Getting the Fault Knowledge
In most domains, getting complete, detailed knowledge of faults and their behavior is
highly unlikely. In the domain of physical systems such as the one implemented in
Draphys, it is particularly hard to get detailed knowledge of fault behavior, for the
reasons discussed below.
A key to this problem is the term detailed when referring to fault knowledge. In
this thesis, the most detailed behavior we diagnose is the qualitative description of how
sensor readings differ from their expected value. In this domain, the more detail needed,
the less fault coverage that one is likely to get. There are two major reasons that it
is difficult to get detailed knowledge of fault behavior for such physical systems: first,
it can be difficult to predict all the different manifestations that a particular fault can
exhibit; and second, diagnosis at this level of detail had not been attempted before, so
sources of fault knowledge are difficult to find.
Depending on the severity of a fault, the resulting behavior can appear quite dif-
ferent in different occurrences. Take, for example, a foreign object ingestion. Usually
this occurs when birds are ingested into the engine. Depending on the number of birds
.and the current conditions under which the engine is operating, the resulting symptoms
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coulddiffer both quantitativelyand qualitatively. Representingall the differentpos-
siblebehaviorsis not possible,although this situation occurs often enough to warrant
representing as many as possible. The different manifestations for this and many other
faults cannot be completely predicted, because we have not seen them all to get the
empirical knowledge, and because we do not know how to model physical systems well
enough to completely model faulted physical systems (discussed in section 3.3.1).
The second reason it is difficult to get the knowledge is because diagnosis at this
level of detail has not been attempted before, mainly because the type of monitoring
presented in this thesis produces symptoms at a level of detail that was not previously
available. Before this, the monitoring of sensors generally used fixed thresholds, usually
extreme upper and lower bounds that represent the normal operating range of the
physical system. Whenever the sensor readings varied beyond those limits, an alert
was raised. The type of monitoring that provides input to Draphys does not use fixed
thresholds. Rather, the monitor calculates the expected values for each sensors under
the current operating conditions, and raises an alert when the actual and calculated
sensor readings differ by more than some expected sensor noise level. This monitor can
detect abnormal sensor readings before they exceed the fixed threshold; therefore, the
symptoms are detected more quickly.
Because the monitor is more sensitive to sensor deviations from normal, the fault-
symptom associations used in the fixed-threshold approach do not usually apply. Also,
the human experts (in this case, pilots) do not monitor symptoms at the level of detail
of the monitor. The pilots monitor the aircraft systems based on sensor information
presented on the gauges and dials available in the cockpit, in a manner very similar
to operators of other complex process control systems. Therefore, the monitoring of
the sensors is dependent on the resolution of those gauges and dials. Because the
resolution of these devices is not great, the pilots do not depend on instantaneous
detection of aberrant measurements, or transient measurements. Instead, they reason
about behavior over time periods that may be short but are not instantaneous. They
seem to ignore transients and only reason about steady state behavior over a period
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of time, albeit a short period. Because the pilots do not have information at the same
resolution as the monitor, and because they approximate transients (which they may
not be able to detect, very well because of the information's resolution), the pilots were
not always very good sources of fault-symptoms associations.
In contrast, the symptoms generated by the fault monitor for input to Draphys axe
instantaneous. That is, the monitor identifies discrepancies as soon (within some small
allowance for sensor noise) as they occur. Humans can do the same, but it takes much
time, attention, and mental computation. For these reasons, and because humans are
inherently poor monitors [40], pilots do not monitor the aircraft sensor readings in the
same manner that the fault monitor does. Thus Draphys has more detailed information
about the fault's symptoms than the pilots can provide.
Since the pilots do not have the same kind of symptoms provided to Draphys, they do
not perform diagnosis in a way that can use our more detailed symptoms. Indeed, pilots
rarely perform diagnosis at all. Their behavior can best be described as a stimulus-
response behavior; that is, when they see certain symptoms, they take certain actions.
These represent mental shortcuts that skip the diagnostic process. These shortcuts
can have serious consequences [51], if the shortcuts do not include all the information
necessary to correctly and completely respond in the current fault situation. This also
means that we cannot acquire the fault-symptom associations from pilots, because they
do not have the knowledge we need, : : :: _ :
Because of the reasons mentioned above, it is difficult to acquire knowledge empir-
ically or analytically. The point is not that we cannot get any knowledge, but rather
that the knowledge is sure to be incomplete.
3.2.3 Other Issues
Several other issues arise, which include the causal relationships among malfunctions,
temporal duration of symptoms, and reasoning with uncertainty.
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Causal Relationships
Another consideration that affects the issue of representation is causal relationships
among malfunctions and the resulting symptom coverage issue. The issue of symptom
coverage is the question of whether a fault hypothesis should be considered valid if it
only covers a subset of the current symptoms. This question arises because a malfunc-
tion of a particular component (e.g., compressor stall) may cause other components to
malfunction. Stating this a different way, some malfunctions may cause other malfunc-
tions to occur simultaneously. This can occur in a compressor stall, which may cause a
flameout in the combustion section. It is important to recognize that these may not be
mutually exclusive malfunctions, but can be related causally (although each could occur
independently without causing the other). Therefore, it can be important to identify
when a hypothesis does not account for all symptoms, and when multiple hypotheses
could be related causally.
Although this knowledge currently is not included in Draphys, it might be useful to
include it in the future to help direct the reasoning process.
Temporal Duration of Symptoms
Draphys currently does not represent the temporal duration of symptoms. Given two
faults with the same initial symptoms, the length of time that the symptoms last
may allow elimination of one of the hypotheses. However, inclusion of the possible
range of symptoms' duration in our fault knowledge for all possible manifestations of
a fault would be difficult in this domain, for several reasons. First, the knowledge of
the symptom duration would have to describe a range of time. This is because the
duration of a particular symptom will probably vary, depending on factors such as the
severity of the fault. Moreover, this type of duration information may be very difficult
to obtain, as it is in this domain.
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False Positives
In the design of a diagnostic approach, a choice should be considered whether to prefer
false-positive hypotheses (identifying a fault that is not the current problem) by being
less stringent about the requirements on a hypothesis, or whether to prefer false-negative
hypotheses by being more stringent. Draphys was designed to prefer false-positive hy-
potheses to false-negative hypotheses. The motivation behind this was that, in general,
it is better to be conservative, wasting some time thinking something might be faulted
that was not, than to have an accident thinking something was working that was not.
Therefore, the known-fault associations were designed to have minimally stringent con-
ditions.
3.3 Related Work
We describe related work in association-based approaches, temporal reasoning, and
reasoning about fault propagation behavior.
3.3.1 Association-Based Approaches
The output of most diagnosis systems is a set of fault hypotheses that correspond to
the appropriate set of symptoms. These symptoms are either provided as input or
determined as part of the diagnostic process. Diagnostic approaches based on specific
fault-symptom associations have been extensively explored. Here we consider two areas
relevant to operative diagnosis where progress has been made. These areas include
the source of the knowledge, and reasoning about propagation behavior of the fault or
disease over time.
Sources of Associational Knowledge
Associational rules are often used to represent the correspondence between symptoms
and faults. These associational rules are usually generated in one of two ways. The
first, used in expert systems, is to acquire experiential rules from a diagnostic expert in
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the domain ofinterest.I The secondisthe hult dictionaryapproach,which storesfault-
symptom associations,used inconventionalhardware diagnostics.With each approach
the costof generationand retrievalof the compiled knowledge must be considered.
Experientialrulesacquired from experts may provide a very powerful means of
doing diagnosticproblem solving.Experts use heuristicsbased on much experience,
and theseheuristicsoftenwork very well.However, experientialruleshave two major
difficulties:theiracquisitionand theircompleteness.Acquisitionisdii_icultbecause the
expertsoftencannot articulatetheirproblem solvingtechniques.Even ifthisproblem
isovercome, thereisno way toguaranteethatthe setofassociationalrulesiscomplete
fora particulardomain. This lackofcompletenessisa major problem foran automated
diagnosticsystem that only reasonswith specificassociationalknowledge, and itdoes
not reflecthe gracefuldegradationofthe human expert'sproblem solvingcapabilities.
The faultdictionaryapproach commonly usedinhardware troubleshooting[8]usesa
model ofthe physicalsystem tosimulatethe fault'sbehavior.2 The resultingsymptoms
arestoredinfault-symptom associationsthatare retrievedlaterfrom thisdictionaryof
faults.This approach isused inelectronicircuits,becausethisdomain can be modeled
readilyand theclassoffaultsconsiderediseasytosimulateinthe model. This approach
requiresa realisticmodel capableof simulatingfaultedsystem behavior togetherwith
knowledge of the type offaultsto be simulated.
While thismay be satisfactoryfora specificfaulttype ina domain suchas electronic
circuits,itisdifficulttoapply thisapproach inother domains. For example, in devices
such as a turbofan jetengine,modeling of normal behavior iswellunderstood, but
modeling ofabnormal behaviorisnot. Simulationmodels forthesedevicesare based
on certainassumptions,such as steady statebehavior. By theirvery nature,faults
insuch devicesare oftentransient,although they may eventuallyachievesome steady
statebehavior. Because of th!s,and because of lackof knowledge of the physicsof
1Experts' rules may represent problem solving heuristics as well as fault-symptom associations, but
we only consider the associations here.
_See [11] for a discussion of traditionM approaches to hardware troubleshooting.
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complex devices, modeling of faulted system behavior to acquire symptomatic behavior,
especially behavior over time, is not feasible because of limitations in current modeling
technology [5], [44].
The fault dictionary approach is useful in the electronic circuit domain because it is
easy to model the behavior of the fault that is the most common (a "stuck-at" fault).
However, other types of faults can occur that were not one of the types modeled, such
as a bridge fault. If a fault occurs which was not included in the fault dictionary, the
fault dictionary approach cannot diagnose it.
Each of the two approaches for acquiring associational knowledge has advantages.
The fault dictionary approach may be complete for a particular class of faults, assuming
the model used was complete. IIowever, the experiential rules may represent fault-
symptom associations for fault behavior that we do not know how to model. Moreover,
the expert may provide heuristics that make the problem solving process more efficient.
Even if the fault dictionary were complete, and we assume every type of fault is
represented, one must consider the cost of retrieval at diagnosis time. The cost of
generating a fault dictionary may be quite high, but the compiled fault dictionary
will at least be more efficient than constructing it "on the fly." The cost in time and
storage requirements of searchingfor the appropriate association becomes unacceptable,
especially for operative diagnosis, and particularly if one includes multiple faults.
3.3.2 Temporal Reasoning
As discussed in [56], there are several ontologies for representing temporal relationships.
We chose Allen's interval-based formalism [4], because it was a natural means of ex-
pressing the relationships among qualitative symptoms, where the intervals represent
the time interval during which a sensor maintains the qualitative value. We found this
to be adequate for expressing the associational knowledge.
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3.3.3 Diagnosing Fault Propagation
In operative diagnosis, the effect of a failed component will propagate through the
device. There are two categories of propagation. One is the case where the fault causes
the component to produce output that is outside its normal operating range, thereby
providing input to another component outside its normal range of input vMues. This
may cause that component to malfunction.
The other category is the case where the faulty component produces output that is
abnormal for the current operating conditions, but is not outside the normal operating
range of the affected component. The component is operating in a degraded mode,
compared with its expected operation under the current conditions. As we discussed
earlier, it can be important to identify when the component is operating abnormally
for the total functioning of the system, even though the component is working correctly
for its inputs.
For the goal of providing corrective actions in operative diagnosis, the distinction
between these two categories may be important. For example, if affected components
are malfunctioning but are not physically broken, they can continue operating. How-
ever, if the component is physically broken (or will be shortly), the action taken in
response may be quite different.
Pan [39] addressed the problem of dependent failures, where a fault in one compo-
nent causes a fault in another. In particular, he addresses the situation where a fault
in one component generates output that takes on values outside of the normal range
of values. Therefore, the input to the downstream component is outside of the normal
input range. He explicitly represented knowledge of how individual components could
fail, and used a state-transition network to represent the causal relationships that result
in dependent failures.
Medical diagnosis must deal with the issue of propagation for much the same rea-
son we do in diagnosis of artifacts: diagnosis of a physical system in operation. The
propagation behavior of diseases is often represented in a causal network that includes
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the differentdiseasemanifestations[58][43][42].
3.4 Limitations
The technology for representing specific associational knowledge is available, and could
be applied to operative diagnosis, ttowever, no matter what approach is pursued for
acquiring and representing associational knowledge, its completeness cannot be guar-
anteed. As these approaches are applied to increasingly complex physical systems, this
lack of completeness becomes a more serious problem. In an association-based diag-
nostic approach, we consider that we have encountered a novel fault when the current
symptoms do not correspond to any of the associational knowledge. In practice, it is
very important to diagnose faults to support the continued, safe operation of the phys-
ical system. An important issue to be addressed, then, is what diagnosis information
should we produce when the symptoms encountered do not correspond to faults in our
knowledge base.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the need to represent the dynamic behavior of faults.
We approached this by acquiring knowledge from human experts, who in our domain
axe pilots. We represented the reasoning that they described in production rules, and
implemented the capability of using temporal predicates in the conditional part of the
rules.
We learned several lessons from this. First, the reasoning they described used the
temporal sequence in which symptoms occurred to disambiguate hypotheses. Next,
it was very difficult to acquire the knowledge. Because the knowledge is difficult to
acquire
Techniques are available for representing associational knowledge about known faults.
The rule-based representation is probably not optimal. Other approaches might im-
prove upon the rule-based representation, but independent of the representation used,
53
an important issue (and a primary focus of this research) is diagnosis of faults when
the symptoms do not match the specific associational knowledge. In the next chapter,
we describe our approach to dealing with this issue.
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Chapter 4
Diagnosis of Novel Faults Via Abstraction
Diagnosis of novel faults is generally considered to be a major capability of a diagnostic
system that can degrade gracefully. But what exactly does it does it mean to degrade
gracefully? In hardware, graceful degradation usually means the ability to continue
operating reasonably well even when portions of the hardware system are broken. One
would not expect the performance of the system to be as high as an unbroken system,
but at least to be adequate.
In humans, especially experts, graceful degradation has an additional meaning. It
also refers to the ability to solve problems unlike those seen before and to know the
boundaries of one's knowledge. Problem solving behavior changes when these bound-
aries are reached. Indeed, such a capability is considered to be part of expertise. If an
expert cannot immediately solve a problem, he does not just give up. He tries other
problem-solving approaches and calls on other types of knowledge than those initially
used.
Such robust problem-solving behavior requires that the human know when the cur-
rent problem solving approach is not succeeding, what other problem solving techniques
to use, when he should use the other techniques, and what knowledge is required to
use each technique. In this chapter, we present an approach to robust problem solving
that uses abstraction as a technique for dealing with novel faults. In this approach, we
reason at a higher level of abstraction about the device's operational status. In doing
so, we produce less specific information about the device when novel faults occur. That
is, the specificity of the diagnosis is what degrades.
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4.1 Diagnosis of Novel Faults
What does it mean for a fault to be novel? We define a fault as novel if we do not have
specific knowledge relating the current symptoms to a fault. However, even though
we do not have specific knowledge about the fault, we may still be able to provide
less specific diagnostic knowledge. For example, we may be able to say what is broken
without saying how it is broken. That is, we choose to view diagnosis of novel faults
as an issue of specificity. The basic idea is that graceful degradation is not achieved
by simply exploring whether something is known about faults, but at what level of
detail it is known. Knowledge at different levels of specificity can provide different fault
coverage, but increasing fault coverage is achieved at the cost of degrading specificity.
For historical reasons, we shall continue to use the term "novel fault" to mean a fault
which the diagnostic system cannot identify specifically. If the diagnostic system cannot
identify exactly what the fault is by using specific knowledge about the physical system,
it can still generate useful diagnostic information, even if it is less detailed than desired.
We consider diagnostic information to be useful if providing it to the human operator
helps him continue safe operation of the physical system, either by a more complete
or correct response, or by aiding him in better understanding the status of the faulted
system. An explanation of what motivated the choice of abstraction, and why the less
specific information can be useful, follows.
Before presenting the approach, it is useful to explore what information we should
abstract and why. If the goal of the diagnostician is to select a remedial action to take
in response to the fault, the information should be generated to support that selection.
During the interviews of experts, they described default actions that they would take
if they did not recognize the fault or if there were multiple possible hypotheses. This
action was generally a conservative response to the fault. For example, if the pilot knew
he had a fan failure, but did not know how the fan was broken, he would shut down
the engine. However, if he knew it were an eroded fan blade, he might reduce power on
that engine. The point is that he had an action associated with fan failures that was
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(potentially) different from the action associated with the specific fan hypothesis.
Motivated by this and other examples, it seemed useful to form general categories of
faults with associated default actions, and to examine the relationship of the resulting
hypotheses with the known-fault hypotheses. In the aircraft domain, these categories
are formed according to the components in the physical system, as exemplified above.
When novel faults occur, diagnostic reasoning takes place at a higher level of abstrac-
tion. Hypotheses are produced that identify what component is faulty, without iden-
tifying how the component is broken. The relationship between the so-called known
faults and the general categories is a specificity relationship. That is, the operational
status of the component is abstracted to "normal" or "abnormal," so we named this
abstraction status abstraction.
Since we designed the diagnostic reasoning to identify the component that is faulty,
thus reasoning at the higher level of status abstraction, we can abstract the symptoms,
also. Although it is necessary at the lower level to identify how the symptomatic sensor
compares with its expected value (e.g., high or low), it is not necessary to make this
distinction at the higher level. It is only necessary to identify that the value of the sensor
is "abnormal" compared with the expected value. This is also status abstraction, but
it is the status of the parameter value that is abstracted. Figure 4.1 illustrates the
relationship between the fault hypotheses and the corresponding symptoms at both
abstraction levels currently used. We discuss this abstraction in more detail in section
4.3.2.
Another motivation for the approach taken is that it is useful to the human operator
to identify the faulty component, even if we cannot provide a large amount of detail
about how it failed. One reason is that humans have sensors that cannot easily or
economically be duplicated. They hear things, see things, and use their intuition.
Therefore, the human may have additional information that can help him select a
corrective action.
The pilots also described reasoning in a structural hierarchy to perform localization
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of the fault. Having this localization information seemed to help in narrowing the
choices of actions to take. Providing the localization information may prevent errors,
such as shutting down the wrong engine (as occurred in the recent British Midlands
737 crash). We use structural abstraction in Draphys for localization.
4.2 Diagnostic Reasoning at the Higher Status Abstraction Level
The reasoning at the higher level of status abstraction is a generate-and-test process.
When symptoms first appear, the generator localizes the fault in a component hierarchy,
resulting in a set of candidate components that might be the source of the problem.
It then constructs fault hypotheses by simulating fault propagation from each of the
candidates. Each resulting hypothesis is then tested to determine if it is valid; that
is, if a fault in the hypothesized responsible component could cause all the current
symptoms. Often, this generate-and-test process results in multiple valid hypotheses.
If new symptoms arrive as time progresses, the generator tries to incrementally update
the old hypotheses to determine whether they account for the new symptoms. If they
do, they are retained. Otherwise, they are pruned.
To see how Draphys diagnoses failures, recall the example in Chapter 2 of a fan
failure. We will step through the example again, elaborating each problem solving
step.
4.2.1 Fault Localization
The first Symptom detected is in N1 only. Since Nl is an engine parameter,
Draphys localizes the fault to the engine subsystem.
Localization is the process of reducing the number of candidate faulty components
by refinement within a structural hierarchy of a design description. This structural
hierarchy describes a component hierarchy, where primitive components are grouped
into higher level composite components. 1 Performing localization within a component
aThe grouping Of components into higher level components must follow certain guidelines, as de-
scribed in Chapter 6.
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hierarchy assumes that fault behavior occurs locally; that is, faults propagate from
one component to another component that is "close" in some way. This assumption is
almost always true for fault behavior over a short time period.
Figure 4.2 depicts the process of localization. Starting at the top of a component
hierarchy, the process first refines to the next level within that hierarchy. The sensors
associated with each component at that level are examined. If all symptoms are a
proper subset of the sensors associated with that component and only that component,
the fault is said to be localized to that component. The process refines the localized
component into its subcomponents. This continues until the fault cannot be localized
further.
As an example, consider symptoms in EPR and EGT and the component hierarchy
depicted in Figure 4.3. The initial input is the airplane representation (Airplane) and
the set of symptoms (EGT and EPR). When we refine in the component hierarchy,
we produce the set of components that are the subparts of Airplane, the Propulsion -
system and the Hydraulic-system. Iterating through this set, start with Propulsion-
system. We then identify all sensors associated with Propulsion - system, resulting in
the set Fuel-flow, EPR, EGT, N1, 3/2. Since the set of symptoms (EGT, EPR) is a
proper subset of this set, we repeat the entire process at the next level in the component
hierarchy.
Note that the localization process is mainly useful when faults first occur. Because of
the propagation behavior, the localization may be increasingly difficult and accomplish
less pruning as time (and the effect of the fault) progresses.
4.2.2 Generating Candidate Components
Each component in the engine subsystem is then proposed as a candidate
responsible component.
Once the fault is localized to a subsystem or set of subsystems, the candidate gen-
eration process can proceed. At present, the set of candidates is the union of the set(s)
of primitive components of the localized subsystem(s). For our example, the fault is
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localized to the engine. The set of primitive components in Engine is then generated,
resulting in the following set: Fan, N_, Compressor, N2, Combustor, Turbine, EGT,
EPR. Each component in this set is then proposed as the source of the fault. (Dra-
phys does not order this set. If a probability of failure were known for each component,
however, Draphys could order the set accordingly.)
4.2.3 Qualitative Simulation of Fault Propagation
For each proposed responsible component, Draphys generates a fault hypoth-
esis by qualitatively simulating the fault propagation behavior. In this example,
Draphys will first propose the fan as the responsible component. Draphys reasons
about a model of the engine and its functional interconnections to determine that
the high-pressure compressor and the N1 sensor functionally depend on the fan.
Knowing these interconnections, Draphys then attempts to continue simulating
the propagation of the failure to functionally dependent components.
The input to this process is the set of symptoms and a candidate component. The
output is a propagation path which begins with the candidate component and which
identifies the system status consistent with the symptoms and candidate component.
Draphys determines the extent of the propagation of abnormal component status
by simulating the propagation of the failure from the candidate component. First, the
candidate component is proposed as the source of the problem. Then, all components
that are dependent on the candidate component for proper operation are examined to
determine whether the fault has affected them.
This simulation process is a traversal of the links in the graph representation of the
functional model. Traversal of a link between two nodes represents simulation of a fault
propagating along the path represented by that link between two components repre-
sented by the nodes connected by the link. Generating a hypothesis is the construction
of a subgraph of the functional model to correspond to the part of the physical system
affected by the fault. As the traversal process continues, each node that is determined
to be affected, and each link that represents a fault propagation between two affected
components, are added to the hypothesis subgraph.
Determining whether a component is affected by a fault is done by examining the
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sensor(s)associatedwith the component. A sensor is associated with a component
if it measures something about that component's operation. We have defined three
association types, or ways that a sensor can be associated with a component. These
three association types are related to what we call infer about the operational status of
the component from the sensor status.
The first association type refers to sensors that can have abnormal readings without
their associated component having abnormal operational status. If the sensor measuring
some characteristic of a component's input is symptomatic, the effect of the fault is
reflected in the input to the component, but it may not yet be affecting the operation
of the component itself. Therefore, we do not consider the component to be affected
by the fault unless further propagation can be identified. As an example, suppose we
have a pressure sensor which measures the pressure of the air entering the fan. There
may be an abnormal drop in air pressure, but this may not affect the fan yet.
The second type of association occurs when the sensor having a normal reading
does not necessarily mean that the component's operational status is normal. For
example, EGT measures the temperature of the exhaust from the turbine. If EGT is
symptomatic, then we consider the turbine to be affected. However, EGT normal does
not necessarily mean that the operation of the turbine is normal, because it might be
faulted in some way without affecting the exhaust temperature.
The third association type occurs with sensors which reflect the operational status
of the component. For example, a Fuel- Pressure sensor measures the pressure of the
fuel coming out of the fuel pump. This sensor status reflects the status of the fuel pump,
since this sensor provides a measure of the component's function. For tracking fault
propagation, we consider a component to be affected if its sensor with this association
type is symptomatic, and unaffected otherwise. That is, the component's operational
status can be identified from the sensor's status.
There are other complicating factors in relating sensor status to component status.
Computed sensors, such as EPR, may have associations with more than one component.
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In Draphys, we identify the association between EPR and the fan and between EPR
and the turbines. When EPR becomes abnormal, we must consider both associated
components, since the individual pressure readings from which EPR is computed axe
unavailable.
If the componeut is determined to be unaffected, simulation of fault propagation
stops along this particular path. Otherwise, propagation continues from each affected
component. Draphys adds each affected component to a directed graph that represents
the propagation path of the fault. The nodes in the graph represent the affected com-
ponents, and a link from one node to another represents the propagation of the effect
of the fault from the component corresponding to the first node to the component rep-
resented by the second node. When this propagation path contains all symptomatic
sensors; i.e., when the explanation of the fault's behavior accounts for exactly the set
of current symptoms, we consider it to be a valid hypothesis.
The model used to simulate functional propagation of a fault is component centered.
It models the functional dependencies among components. The functional dependencies
represent potential paths of intended interaction among components in the physical
system that axe designed into the system; i.e., component B is functionally dependent
on component A if the proper operation of B depends on the proper operation of A.
This occurs, for example, when the input to B depends on the output of A. Thus if
A is malfunctioning, the effect may be that its output is incorrect. The input to B
is abnormal, so B's operation is necessarily affected. B may be operating completely
correctly given the inputs it has, but since the inputs are wrong, B's outputs will be
wrong for the larger context. Thus the notion of abnormal operation of a component
is dependent on the context of the overall operation of the physical system.
It is important to note that the functional dependencies represent potential paths
of interaction. For example, component B may depend on component A for its proper
operation, but only under certain circumstances, such as a switch being turned on. The
context under which the interaction may occur is not modeled in this representation
of functional relationships. A functional dependency between two components only
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suggests that an interaction may occur, not that it must occllr.
Functional depe,dencies are represented by directional links within a directed graph,
where the nodes of the graph represent the components. Figure 4.4 illustrates the
functional model of the engine. Cycles in the graph represent the feedback in the
system.
This is a model of the normal functioning of the physicM system, but it is abstract
enough to model the system with many faults as well. This is mainly because this func-
tional dependency relationship between components does not say how the components
interact, merely that they could. Many faults will cause the components to interact
along the same paths of interaction that are normally foIIowed, so we can use this mode]
to simulate the propagation of abnormal effects _mong the components. In fact, many
faults which do not involve physical damage propagate along normal functional paths
of interaction. It is this which gives the model the power to allow us to make inferences
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aboutfault propagation.
Draphys then explores all remaining functional propagation paths. When all
paths are exhausted, the hypothesis is tested for validity.
Draphys then uses the same simulation process from each remaining candidate
component to construct the hypothesis corresponding to that component. After all
possibilities are explored, two valid hypotheses remain... The first is that the fan is
the responsible component, and the second is that the N1 sensor failed.
The hypotheses created from this process are shown in Figure 4.5. Out of these,
only two are valid. As we mentioned earlier, the propagation paths are subgraphs
of the functional model, augmented by including system status information. When a
subgraph includes all symptomatic sensors, it represents a valid hypothesis.
4.2.4 Discrimination Based On Dynamic Inputs
Extending this example further illustrates the incremental updating of hy-
potheses. Assume that a short time after the N1 symptom was first detected and
diagnosed, a symptom in N2 is detected. Draphys then tries to extend the propaga-
tion path of all the valid hypotheses to explain the new symptoms. These paths are
extended by continuing the qualitative simulation from the end of the propagation
path in the old hypotheses.
The reasoning at the higher abstraction level is designed and implemented to han-
dle new symptoms that arrive after the initial diagnosis is done. To accomplish this,
Draphys uses the same simulation process as when the hypothesis was initially created,
except that it begins the simulation from the point in the valid hypothesis' propaga-
tion path where the propagation ended before. 2 For example, take the valid hypothesis
where the fan is the source of the problem. The propagation ended at the fan rather
than continuing to the compressor, because N2 was not symptomatic when this hy-
pothesis was created. However, when Draphys starts propagation again from the fan,
simulation of propagation can continue to the compressor because its sensor is affected
now. Draphys adds the compressor and N2 sensor to the propagation path and con-
tinue propagating. There is a functional dependency path from the compressor to the
_Note that this assumes that all previously affected components remain affected.
T
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Propagation Path And Component Status:
Propagation Type: FunctiOnal
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Figure 4.5: All IIypotheses (Valid and Invalid) Resulting From _ Symptom in N1.
68
combustor, but the combustor has no associated sensor to confirm its operational sta-
tus. Therefore, Draphys marks it as "possibly affected" and continues propagation. It
follows a functional dependency path to the turbines, but all turbine sensors are non-
symptomatic. Therefore, Draphys assumes that the turbines are unaffected and stops
propagation at the combustor. If the turbines had been affected, Draphys would have
marked the combustor as definitely affected as well.
Figure 4.6 shows the resulting hypothesis. Note that this accounts for all current
symptoms. Also note that the updated propagation path enlarges the subgraph of the
functional model to accommodate the new symptoms. This example illustrates the
incremental nature of the hypothesis construction, since it builds on previously created
hypotheses to account for new symptoms.
Continuing this example even further, suppose we now see symptoms in
EPR and EGT. The hypothesis shown in Figure _.6 is extended by continuing
simulation from the point(s) in the propagation path where it stopped, resulting
in the hypothesis shown in Figure _. 7. Once propagation to the turbine is con-
firmed, the status of the combustor is updated to "definitely affected," since the
reasoning assumes that the fault would not affect the turbine without affecting the
combustor.
This example illustrates the benefit of the approach for diagnosing systems with
feedback. If the engine were being diagnosed in an environment where the sequence of
symptoms was not available, but the set of symptoms was, then all major (non-sensor)
components would be candidates that could not be discriminated without more de-
tailed information. However, examining the temporal sequence in which the symptoms
appeared permits isolation of the source of the fault.
Note that we did not describe any multiple-fault hypotheses to explain the multiple
symptoms. This is because we use a heuristic that we do not produce multiple-fault
hypotheses when we can produce valid single-fault hypotheses that account for the
current symptoms. The next chapter will discuss this heuristic in the more global
context of multiple classes of faults.
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4.3 General Discussion
The previous section described the approach as implemented in Draphys and illustrated
two major ideas in this research, the use of status abstraction for graceful degradation
and the incremental, constructive approach to generating hypotheses. In the following
sections, we consider both the structural abstraction used in the localization and status
abstraction. We then examine several aspects of the abstractions and the reasoning.
We then discuss the incremental updating of hypotheses, and highlight its advantages.
4.3.1 Structural Abstraction
The component hierarchy shown in Figure 4.3 and used for localization in Draphys
represents an abstraction of the structure of the physical system. The type of abstrac-
tion used is an aggregation of lower level elements into higher level, composite compo-
nents, which we also call subsystems. The resulting relationship between a composite
component and one of its aggregated parts is a part-of relationship. Many diagnostic
approaches use component hierarchies in their reasoning; we include a discussion here
on how the component hierarchy is defined and used in Draphys.
The aggregation of components into higher levels in this component hierarchy was
done based on a functional grouping, a That is, components that contribute to a par-
ticular functionality are grouped together. For example, all components which are
considered to be part of the engine are grouped together. Similarly, components which
contribute to the workings of the hydraulics are grouped together into a hydraulic sub-
system. To support efficient localization, this hierarchy must form a tree, in that a
component may only be part of one composite component. If the hierarchy does not
form a tree, then the localization process cannot prune entire branches.
The purpose of the grouping is to aid in the localization; that is, to support the
efficient exoneration of components. The motivation for using the functional grouping,
as described, is the observation that faults tend to propagate (at least in short time
3The grouping also depends on sensor placement; see chapter 6 for a discussion of this.
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periods) to components that are designed to interact with the responsible component.
Therefore, by grouping the components according to function, we improve the efficiency
of the localization process for many faults.
Components which are functionally grouped may not be physically located together.
For example, the hydraulic subsystem has parts which are physically located through-
out both airplane wings and the fuselage. One could envision a component hierarchy
where the components are aggregated based on physical location rather than function-
ality. Such a component hierarchy can be useful, and we will discuss the use of such a
component hierarchy in the next chapter.
As mentioned previously, the component hierarchy must be defined in a particular
way in order to permit pruning of entire branches of the hierarchy. In Chapter 6, we
identify some knowledge engineering guidelines for building the component hierarchies.
4.3.2 Status Abstraction
In this section, we discuss the form of abstraction that we have named status abstrac-
tion. This form of abstraction is a key factor in our approach to graceful degradation
in diagnostic problem solving, because it supports reasoning about the fault and its
propagation behavior in less detail as more specific knowledge is not available. We first
discuss what is being abstracted, and the corresponding behavioral abstraction. We
then consider other ways of categorizing faults than by operational status of compo-
nents.
In different levels of status abstraction, operational status of a physical component
is described at different levels of detail. 4 For example, at the higher level of status
abstraction, a component's operational status is described as either normal or abnormal.
The lower level describes in more detail how the component is abnormal. For example,
at the lower level, an oil filter would be described as clogged. That description of how the
component is broken is abstracted to abnormal at the higher level of status abstraction.
_We only consider abstraction of the operational status of primitive components here, although the
same could be done for composite components.
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Figure 4.8: Examples of Component Status Abstraction.
Of course, describing how a component is abnormal can be done at differing levels of
detail, but we only implemented one level of detail below the binary level. We show
several examples of components' status and their abstractions in Figure 4.8. Note that
different operational statuses for the fuel line are all grouped together at the higher
level into "fuel line abnormal."
To determine what the operational status of a component is at a particular level of
abstraction, a diagnostician should use a corresponding level of behavior. At the higher
level of status abstraction, we only describe behavior as being normal or abnormal;
that is, a parameter value used to describe the behavior of the device is either normal
or abnormal for the current operating conditions. At the lower level, we are trying
to determine a more detailed description of operational status, so we need to use a
correspondingly more detailed description of behavior.
The advantage of using status abstraction to support graceful degradation is because
we need less detailed descriptions of behavior at higher abstraction levels. For example,
it is easier to determine that a parameter is abnormal than to determine that the same
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parameterwas high or fluctuating, because no reasoning about temporal intervals is
necessary. The difference in determining behavioral descriptions at different levels of
detail may seem insignificant when looking at a single parameter at a single point in
time. However, the difference becomes clearer and more significant when looking at
several parameters' behavior over time and relationship with each other.
There is more to describing behavior than the level of detail of a particular parameter
value, of course. For our diagnostic reasoning, it is also necessary to identify propagation
behavior. This, too, must be described at the appropriate level of abstraction. The
representation of the physical system used to diagnose at a particular abstraction level
should be consistent with the necessary level of behavioral detail.
For the higher level of status abstraction, we must identify the paths of interaction
followed by the fault as it propagates. The functional model used in Draphys is a
model of the normal functional dependencies designed into the physical system, but it
is abstract enough that it allows us to model many faulted systems as well. Moreover,
it allows us to model faulted systems with dependent failures, if the failures follow the
paths of interaction in the normal functioned model (which many do). The reason we
can model even dependent failures is because our description of behavior is so abstract.
As we reason at higher abstraction levels, we achieve greater breadth of fault coverage
at the cost of specificity.
It is important to note that the abstraction levels are independent of the reasoning
techniques applied at those levels. For example, one could use associational reasoning
or model-based reasoning at any level of status abstraction. Another important point is
that this is not just abstraction of abnormal operational status, but normal operational
status as well. However, since we are performing diagnosis, the abnormal status is the
motivation for the abstraction scheme chosen.
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Categorization of the Faults by Component Operational Status
Draphys abstractsfaultsaccordingto the operationalstatusof the physicalcompo-
nents thatmake up the device,but itcould categorizefaultsinother ways. In artifact
diagnosis,we could categorizethe faultsby structuralabstraction.One of the moti-
vatingfactorsbehind performinghierarchicaldiagnosisin a structuralhierarchyisthat
itdoes provide some capabilityforgracefuldegradation.That is,the diagnosisgoes
as far down the hierarchy as it can, providing useful diagnosis information even when
it cannot diagnose to the lowest level in the hierarchy. Another example in medicine
might be disease categories; e.g., cancer is one such category.
The choice of categorization scheme might be based on many motivations. A major
organizational motivation is the existence of a corrective action corresponding to a
fault category. If there is some action or therapy associated with the general fault
category (which may not be the same as actions for specific faults within the category),
then the diagnostician can fall back on that action when the specific fault cannot be
identified. For example, if a doctor can identify a problem as a bacterial infection, but
cannot identify what type, the recommended prescription might be a wide-spectrum
antibiotic. If the specific bacteria type can be identified, the doctor would prescribe an
antibiotic specific to that bacteria.
In Draphys, we assume that identifying the best (safest, most likely to correct
or compensate) response is a major motivating factor, and that specific hypotheses
are associated with the most-preferred actions, but the more general hypotheses and
associated default actions are better than nothing.
Levels of Status Abstraction
Draphys currently uses two status abstraction levels, but could include more levels. It is
possible to have a level of status abstraction between the two current status abstraction
levels that identifies the level of severity of the fault's effect on the component. For
example, at the most specific level we might describe an eroded compressor blade. At
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an intermediatelevel, the compressor's operational status is abstracted to "operating
but at a degraded level." (Another operational status at this level might be "totally
nonoperational.') At the highest abstraction level, the operation status is "abnormal."
An even more detailed status abstraction level might refine "eroded compressor blade"
to a description of how badly eroded it is.
The levels of abstraction chosen might be determined by the information require-
ments of the human operating the physical system. For instance, they might corre-
spond to the default actions available as less specific information about the fault can
be determined. Conversely, overly detailed levels serve no purpose if the additional
discriminating power they appear to provide has no practical consequences. Even when
actions are not available, the information at a particular abstraction level might still be
useful to the human, just as localization can be useful information to the human. This
must be determined by examining the domain itself, and what information the human
operator can use to make decisions.
4.3.3 Constructive Versus Classification Problem Solving
It is interesting to note that the reasoning at the higher level of status abstraction is
constructive. That is, hypotheses are constructed (and tested) via simulation rather
than retrieved from a set of pre-enumerated solutions as in classification problem solving
[9].
We could create associational rules at the higher level of status abstraction, but
this is undesirable for reasons similar to those discussed in the previous chapter, as
follows. First, it is difficult to know how much propagation to express in the rules. If
the rules only express the initial symptoms, a rule can be satisfied as soon as symptoms
appear. This has the disadvantage that we cannot easily use subsequent symptoms to
distinguish hypotheses. Moreover, it is difficult to determine dynamic system status
using associational rules because of the variability of fault propagation, both over time
and extent of effect.
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Second, since we base the reasoning on use of a model of normal functional structure,
there is no need to store or search through a large set of rules that represent each
propagation step. The same model can be used for all faults whose propagation behavior
follows the functional dependency paths designed into the physical system. This is
because the model of the normally operating system used in Draphys is also a model of
the system under many fault conditions as well. Moreover, determining system status
during the simulation process is straightforward.
Third, since all symptoms are treated identically at this level of status abstraction,
a single model and a simple inference technique (simulation of propagation of a single
fault) are sufficient to diagnose faults within this fault class. The only search process
that takes place is the generation of candidates. Because of this, the efficiency of this
reasoning process depends to a great extent on the pruning ability of the localization
process. In turn, the localization process's pruning ability depends on the proper or-
ganization of the component hierarchy, as discussed earlier, and on sensor sampling
rate. If much time passes between samples, more fault propagation will occur, making
it more difficult to isolate the fault to a small set of candidate components. Given a
candidate component, the level of abstraction of the physical system's behavior must
be general enough that using simulation to construct hypotheses will be efficient.
We could do the diagnostic reasoning within the specific level of abstraction using
a constructive approach. To obtain the same detailed fault information as the specific
associational knowledge, such an approach would represent simulation of the broken
device. However, physical-system modeling technology cannot adequately represent
specific system behavior. For example, representing transient behavior is not well un-
derstood; existing modeling techniques typically assume steady state behavior of the
physical system [44]. But a fault by its very nature is often transient, although sub-
sequent behavior may assume some steady state characteristics. This would not be a
problem at the higher abstraction level because the ]eve] of detail at which we describe
the behavior of the system abstracts away details and just identifies paths of interac-
tion. One advantage of empirical associational rules, though, is that they can express
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empirical relationships between symptoms and faults for which no underlying theory or
model exists. A diagnostician may know from experience that there is an association
between certain symptoms and a particular fault (or corrective action) without knowing
why they are associated. We did not encounter any examples of this in our domain,
but such a situation may occur in other domains.
The issue of constructive versus classification problem solving is explored further in
the next chapter.
4.4 Related Work
We consider related work in both AI and psychology here. In the AI area, we consider
the use of abstraction for problem solving, diagnosis of novel faults, and incremental
diagnosis. Most of the relevant work in diagnosis involves the use of models of structure
and behavior to relieve the brittleness of current knowledge-based systems. We also
address approaches which use multiple kinds of abstraction for diagnosis. In psychology,
human models of performance were developed b_ed on analysis of verbal protocols of
humans doing fault diagnosis.
4.4.1 Using Abstraction for Diagnostic Problem Solving
Abstraction is a powerful technique for problem solving in general [48], [28], [10]. We
consider here those approaches to diagnosis which generate abstract fault hypotheses,
and whether that abstraction is used implicitly or explicitly.
4.4.2 Diagnosing Novel Faults
In AI, most approaches to diagnosis of novel faults use the same definition we do, that
the fault is one for which specific symptom-fault knowledge is not available. These
approaches use model-based diagnostic reasoning based on models of structure and
behavior. First, we will discuss the model-based diagnostic approaches, then we examine
the specificity of the diagnostic output of these approaches. We also discuss their
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appropriateness for operative diagnosis.
Current research in model-based diagnosis involves reasoning about models of struc-
ture and behavior of the device under consideration, also described as reasoning from
first principles, for example [11], [22], [47], [20], [24], [7], [25], [18]; detailed surveys may
be found in [26] and [13].
The model-based diagnosis process is generally viewed as performing prediction,
candidate generation, and discrimination. Prediction is the process of generating ex-
pectations about behavior, and for identifying discrepancies between expectations and
actual system behavior. For example, given a device model built as a network of compo-
nents, each with its own behavior description, behavior prediction can be accomplished
by propagating the individual behaviors of each component. The behavior prediction
in Draphys generates expected behavior for each component compared with the normal
operation of the device as a whole. This computation is discussed in section 1.3.2; we
also describe this process as monitoring rather than prediction. The reason that we use
this type of monitoring is because we need to provide a comprehensive system status
to the human operator. To do that, we must track the progression of the fault, even
when diagnosing systems with feedback.
Candidate generation produces one or more explanations for any discrepancies
found. There are several ways to perform this task. One approach uses only knowledge
of normal system behavior. In this approach, each prediction is associated with the set
of components whose correct behavior supports that prediction. Therefore, any dis-
crepancy between that prediction and actual behavior can be explained by the failure
of one or more of the components in that set. If there are several discrepancies, the
broken components must form a covering set of all discrepancies. This approach is the
basis of the candidate generation procedures in many research efforts, which can be
described as a dependency tracing process, although the details and formality of the
descriptions differ (e.g., [22], [11], [49], [16], [25], [23] and [47]).
Another approach is to use knowledge about how components fail, or fault models
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[6], [39], besidesusing knowledge about how systems work. After finding a compo-
nent whose failure could explain all symptoms, the effects of known failure types are
simulated. Thus the model-based part of the reasoning is used to identify the faulty
component, and the fault models are used to identify the specific failure. If the list of
known failures is exhaustive, this approach can be used to exonerate components, as
done in SOPHIE [6]. Pan [39] uses fault models to represent known dependent failures,
and explicitly reasons about failures causing other failures. This is particularly appro-
priate for diagnosis of complex physical systems, because dependent failures are a real
possibility. ABEL [41] uses fault models to check the consistency of candidates as they
are generated.
Discrimination is usually done by taking additional measurements or providing dif-
ferent inputs to test the resulting output. For example, [16] proposes an information-
theoretic approach to choosing measurements. Shirley [55] presents an approach to
generating test inputs by exploiting designed behavior. In operative diagnosis, discrim-
ination is limited because additional information is hard to acquire.
Many approaches to novel fault diagnosis produce diagnostic information that is
more abstract than the specific associational knowledge Ill], [22], [29], [16], [20], [47].
That is, they identify the component that is the source of the problem and (usually
implicitly) make some assumptions about the fault's propagation behavior being func-
tionai. The class of faults diagnosed in the implementation of these approaches contains
more specific hypotheses than the fault hypotheses generated by functional propagation
in Draphys, because they assume no dependent failures. Figure 4.9 shows the level of
detail produced by some of these other diagnostic approaches.
The approaches that integrate model-based reasoning with fault models are often
performing at multiple levels of abstraction, even if they are not always explicitly la-
belled as such. Examples include [20] and [39]. One approach that uses and explicitly
identifies multiple levels of abstraction was developed by Abu-Hanna and Gold [2].
This approach uses multiple levels of structural and behavioral abstraction. The be-
havioral abstra_:tions correspond to different levels in the structural hierarchy. That
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is, a qualitative component behavioral state is an abstraction of several subcomponent
states.
In general, diagnosis programs that use the model-based approach generate hypothe-
ses that are less specific than the associational knowledge (unless they are augmented
with specific fault models). That is, they describe what component is the source of the
problem. The faults they diagnose are faults that propagate within a particular model,
usually the functional model. Except for [11], each diagnoses one class of fault. In the
class of failure diagnosed by most of these approaches, only one component is broken
and it does not cause dependent failures. Symptoms may appear on other components
because the input they are receiving is incorrect, but the components are operating
correctly for the inputs they have. None of the approaches are designed to handle sys-
tems with feedback. As a result, they do not completely address the issue of multiple
consequences of a single initial fault in a system that does have feedback.
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Incremental Diagnosis
One of the contributions of this thesis is the incremental construction of hypotheses.
Diagnosis in Draphys is incremental in that it builds on previously created hypotheses
when new symptoms arrive. Another approach that performs incremental diagnosis
is GDE [16]. GDE is similar in the general idea of incrementally building on previ-
ous computations when new information becomes available to discriminate hypotheses.
Itowever, the new information that GDE uses is a measurement taken to get more in-
formation about the faulty device. GDE assumes that all fault propagation has already
occurred when the diagnosis is done. In contrast, Draphys uses the fault propagation
behavior of the system as a discriminator. Therefore, although both approaches are
incremental, the information they use is quite different and how the information is used
to increment the diagnosis is correspondingly different as well.
4.4.3 Human Performance
Rasmussen's work on human performance modeling both in routine task environments
and during unfamiliar task conditions [45] is an important piece of work. This model
describes human problem-solving performance at three different levels, as shown in
Figure 4.10. The lowest level represents skill-based behavior, which is sensory-motor
performance. Riding a bicycle is an example of a skill-based behavior.
The next higher level represents what Rasmussen calls rule-based behavior. In
this level, familiar situations are typically controlled by a stored rule or procedure
which may have been derived empirically during previous occasions, communicated from
another person's knowledge, or created during problem solving or planning. Rasmussen
states that the boundary between skill-based and rule-based performance is not always
distinct, and that much depends on the level of training and attention of the person.
When an unfamiliar situation arises and no rules for response are available from
previous experience, the performance must move to a higher conceptual level that
Rasmussen calls the knowledge-based level. At this level of reasoning, the internal
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Figure 4.10: Levels of Performance of Skilled Human Operators (from [45]).
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structure of the system being reasoned about is explicitly represented by a "mental
model" which may take severM different forms.
What do these levels have to do with graceful degradation in performance of diag-
nosis? If one considers knowledge-based behavior to be the top level, then as a human
becomes more proficient at some task, the reasoning is compiled into the lower levels.
For instance, as one practices driving a car or playing a musical instrument, perfor-
mance becomes proceduralized eventually to skill-based behavior. Not all behavior
becomes skill-based, but most behavior can be compiled to at least the rule-based level
of performance. Thus familiar problem solving tasks are performed at the lower levels,
but unfamiliar, non-routine tasks must take place at the highest, knowledge-based level.
One reason we attribute the ability to degrade gracefully to humans is because they
can reason at different levels as necessary.
Because humans have limited attention span and short term memory, they use
various techniques to facilitate mental data processing. Rasmussen identifies three such
techniques:
• Aggregation - Elements of a representation are aggregated into larger units, chunks,
within the same category of mental model as familiarity with the context increases.
• Abstraction - The representation of properties of a system or environment is gen-
eraiize or abstracted to a model category at a higher level of abstraction.
• Analogies and Use of Ready-Made Solutions- The representation is transferred
to a category of model in which solutions are already known or rules are available
to generate a solution.
This thesis may be viewed as an exploration of the use of abstraction to provide
a structured way of defining Rasmussen's rule-based and knowledge-based levels of
problem solving. Our specific associational rules correspond to Rasmussen's rule-based
reasoning and our higher level of abstraction corresponds to his knowledge-based level.
We did not encounter a need to use any reasoning corresponding to the skill-based level
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in tile diagnostic task, although the recovery task may utilize such reasoning.
4.5 Limitations of Using a Single Physical-System Model
Even though the diagnostic reasoning at a higher level of abstraction can be used
for diagnosing some novel faults, the reasoning as described assumes that the fault
propagates along the normal functional paths of interaction. Not all faults do. Davis
[11] uses the bridge fault in circuits as an example of a fault that propagates along paths
of interaction in a model of physical rather than functional adjacency. In the aircraft
domain, similar concerns arise. As we discuss in the next chapter, faults can occur
that cause damage because of physical proximity rather than functional interaction of
components. The functional model does not represent such fault propagation behavior.
Therefore, the diagnostic reasoning using a functional model, while necessary for some
faults, is not sufficient for others.
4.6 Summary of Diagnosis of Novel Faults Via Abstraction
This chapter presented an approach based on reasoning at a higher status abstraction
level to diagnose faults which cannot be diagnosed using any of the specific associational
knowledge that is available. The type of abstraction used, called status abstraction,
supports graceful degradation in the presence of novel faults because it requires less
specific knowledge about faults, especially faulted system behavior at the higher ab-
straction level, but still produces useful diagnostic information. It provides a tradeoff
between breadth of fault coverage and specificity of the diagnosis; it is the specificity
of the diagnosis that degrades.
The diagnosis at the higher status abstraction level is done using model-based rea-
soning. We showed that some novel faults can be diagnosed using the functional model
at the higher abstraction level, but not all.
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Chapter 5
Diagnosis of Multiple Propagation Types and Fault
Classes
As we showed in the previous chapter, using only the functional model of the physical
system is not enough, because not all faults propagate locally within the functional
model. In this chapter, we introduce the idea of multiple propagation types, and the
partitioning of the hypothesis space to correspond to different fault classes. In partic-
ular, we consider physical and functional propagation, and multiple as well as single
faults.
5.1 The Need for Multiple Models
Another model than the functional model described in Chapter 4 is necessary to sim-
ulate certain fault propagation behavior. The simplest example of this is the class of
faults where a component physically damages another component, e.g., a component
overheats and the heat damages a physically proximate component. Such a path of
interaction does not follow any path within the functional model. To use Davis' termi-
nology [11], the two components are not adjacent in the functional model. However, the
components are adjacent in the physical model. Here, finding the appropriate model
means finding the appropriate adjacency relationship. Note that although we are re-
ferring to adjacency as though it were a binary relationship (i.e., two components are
either adjacent or not), adjacency is actually more complex than that. For example, in
representing physical proximity, one might say that the smaller the distance between
two components, the more adjacent they are. However, we could formulate that rela-
tionship as a binary one by stating that components closer together than some threshold
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d are adjacent, and all others are not. Moreover, as Davis points out, there are many
different types of adjacency; e.g., magnetic or electrical.
Use of adjacency for diagnosis is based on the assumption that interaction between
two components does not occur at a distance (relative to adjacency, that is), and that
the notion of adjacency pertains to a particular model. While this almost always 1
holds for interaction between two components, that only considers behavior local to
those two components. If one needs a more comprehensive view of a fault's behavior
and associated interactions in all affected components, one needs to take a more global
perspective. We showed that there are faults in this domain where more than one
model is necessary to explain the behavior of a particular fault occurrence. Local
interaction between any two components may occur within a single model, but there are
multiple types of interaction when looking at all interactions among all components in
a particular fault occurrence. For example, when a fan blade damages a hydraulic line,
that unintended interaction is because of their physical adjacency. When the broken
fan fails to drive the compressor properly, that interaction is because of functional
adjacency.
5.2 Partitioning of the Hypothesis Space
In the previous chapter, we showed how we could perform diagnostic reasoning at a
higher abstraction level to support diagnosis of some novel faults. However, abstraction
alone is not sufficient for situations where multiple models of the physical system are
needed. The need for a different model of the physical system can occur within each
abstraction level.
From our view of diagnosis as problem solving in a hypothesis space, the solution
is to partition the (single fault) hypothesis space according to the specificity of the
hypotheses as well as the fault's propagation behavior; that is, by the model(s) used in
1Some fault cases involve interaction at a distance, such as a fan blade becoming a projectile and
damaging another engine, but these are rare.
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the fault's diagnosis. At the higher level of status abstraction, such a partitioning groups
the single-fault hypotheses into three such categories: functional propagation only,
physical propagation only, and hybrid propagation within both physical and functional
models.
This partitioning is not restricted solely to a particular level of abstraction. When
choosing a problem solving technique for a particular fault occurrence, both an abstrac-
tion level and propagation type must be selected. Therefore, we define .fault classes that
organize hypotheses by abstraction level, physical system model necessary to simulate
the fault's propagation behavior, and associated problem solving techniques. Essen-
tially, we define fault classes according to the level of detail of what we know about the
fault and its behavior.
At present, Draphys defines four single-fault classes, as shown in Figure 5.1. Asso-
ciated with each class are the assumptions about the fault's behavior, and the corre-
sponding models, abstraction level, and problem solving techniques. Other single-fault
classes might eventually be included, such as intermittent faults and design errors, but
our purpose in this research was to explore a framework in which such classes might be
included as desired.
We already discussed diagnosis of known, commonly occurring faults in Chapter 3
and novel, functional-propagation faults in Chapter 4. We now explore the diagnostic
reasoning within the remaining fault classes.
5.2.1 Physical Propagation Only
As before, the example for this class of fault described in Chapter 2 is presented together
with the corresponding diagnostic reasoning.
Suppose that the fault was .fan blade separation and that the fan blade broke
off and damaged a hydraulic line in the wing to which the engine was attached.
Draphys detects symptoms in N1 and in the hydraulic pressure sensor...by know-
ing that the fan is physically adjacent to the wing containing the hydraulic line,
propagation .from the engine to the wing can be identified.
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Figure 5.2: Engine Physical Propagation Model.
Draphys simulates the propagation of the fault's abnormal effects in the physical
propagation model, just as it simulates fault propagation in the functional model. As
in the functional model, a graph represents the components and the interconnections.
In the physical model, the links are not functional dependencies but rather are physical
dependencies. We call them dependencies, although they may better be described as
"potential paths of interaction because of physical proximity." For lack of a more concise
term, we name these links in a consistent manner with the functional dependency rela-
tionships. These links represent paths of interaction followed by the possible physical
damage that can occur between components when a component breaks or malfunctions
and are a subset of the physical proximity relationships in the physical system. The
physical model of the engine that Draphys uses is shown in Figure 5.2.
The possible physical damage occurs because of physical proximity of the two com-
ponents. However, it would be inefficient to represent all the non-directional physical
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proximity relationships if there is no (or very little) possibility of one component phys-
ically damaging another. We used the example earlier of the fan blade breaking off and
damaging the hydraulic line. Because it is known that fan blades can break, the phys-
ical model should include the (physical) potential path of interactions to components
physically proximate to the fan, such as the hydraulic line. However, it is highly un-
likely that the hydraulic line would break and damage the fan, so we do not represent
an interaction path in the other direction. By only representing physical dependen-
cies based on design knowledge, we substantially reduce the number of paths that the
diagnostic reasoning must explore.
Representing physical relationships as just described is based on design knowledge
of how one component might break and physically damage another. In that sense, the
physical relationships included in the model represent knowledge about how the system
breaks. However, it is not a model of how a component breaks and the resultant behav-
ior, but rather it is a fault propagation model, describing the possible fault propagation
paths. It is not making a very strong (i.e., detailed or stringent) statement about what
fault behavior to expect; merely that these are the paths of physical proximity that
one might expect to see a fault follow. As depicted in Figure 5.3, there are varying
degrees of knowledge about faults, depending on how strongly the knowledge identifies
how the physical system will fail. At one end of the continuum, only information about
the normal physical system is included. Model-based troubleshooting as discussed in
[13] falls at this end of the continuum. At the other end, only knowledge about how
the individual components fail is included. As in our physical dependencies, adding
some knowledge about how the system fails can improve efficiency, and still be in the
middle of the continuum. However, it does limit the coverage of faults. The choice of
how much information to include about how the system fails should be made explicitly
when designing the diagnostic approach.
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One important characteristic of the physical dependencies is to note that these rela-
tionships generally represent unintended interactions that result from physical proxim-
ity, where the functional dependencies represent intended physical interactions. How-
ever, when building the model, we must decide which potential interactions to repre-
sent. If we were concerned with externally-caused physical damage (e.g., battle damage
caused by bullets), Draphys' model of physical dependencies would not be sufficient.
We would have to include all physical proximity relationships, because we could not
eliminate possible interactions based on design knowledge. Many more paths in the
model would have to be represented and explored than Draphys now does.
Another interesting point concerning the physical-propagation hypotheses is that
localization must be done in a physical structure hierarchy. In the previous fault class,
that of functional-propagation faults, localization was done in a component hierarchy
where components were aggregated into higher levels based on functional grouping.
However, since we are reasoning about physical propagation, localization in the func-
tional component hierarchy might exonerate a component that is propagating physi-
cally. For example, suppose component A breaks and propagates physically to compo-
nent X. Suppose A and X are functionally part of different subsystems, but physically
grouped together. Localization in the functional hierarchy might exonerate A, if no
sensors in A'B subsystem are symptomatic yet. Therefore, when looking for physical
propagation, localization should be done in the physical component hierarchy.
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Noneof the pilots describedreasoning about physical damage. We will see in the
accident analysis in Chapter 6 that many of the engine faults that resulted in accidents
involved physical damage. It is possible that diagnosing this type of fault propagation
is difficult for humans, or at least this type of fault is often overlooked.
5.2.2 Hybrid Propagation
For some faults, a single model (physical or functional) cannot adequately model the
entire propagation behavior of the fault. In the aircraft domain, this most commonly
occurs when one component physically damages another, resulting in functional prop-
agation from the two damaged components. The example from Chapter 2, partially
shown below, is one where physical propagation caused functional propagation.
Suppose we have a fan blade failure, with resulting symptoms in NI, N2, and
the hydraulic pressure sensor. The hypothesis Draphys generates .for this example
is presented in Figure 5.4.
Given that we know that functional propagation almost always follows physical
propagation, we could modify the generator to simulate propagation of the fault's ef-
fects in the two models simultaneously. However, this is unnecessary. The hypotheses
describing the propagation within a single model were already generated earlier, when
the fault classes for a single propagation type were explored. Therefore, Draphys takes
advantage of the earlier processing by composing the primitive hypotheses together.
Figure 5.4 shows the composition of three such primitive hypotheses. One describes
the physical propagation from the fan to the hydraulic line, one describes the functional
propagation within the engine, and one describes the functional propagation within the
hydraulic system.
This composition is not done randomly, since we can apply knowledge about how
faults propagate in different models. In Draphys, a single heuristic is used to guide the
composition of primitive hypotheses. This heuristic says that physical propagation can
be followed by functional propagation. No other compositions are considered.
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Using this heuristic reduces substantially the number of compositions examined.
The generator successively examines each physical propagation hypothesis. It assumes
that functional propagation could proceed from any component in the propagation path
of a particular physical hypothesis, so the generator composes the physical hypothesis
with the functional hypotheses from each affected component.
Extending Hybrid Hypotheses
When new symptoms arrive, and we have valid hybrid-propagation hypotheses, Draphys
extends them in a similar manner as described for functional-propagation hypotheses.
Draphys attempts to continue propagation from the components in the propagation
path where propagation halted. In hybrid-propagation hypotheses, the functional-
propagation portions of the hypotheses are extended first. If that does not account
for the new symptoms, then the physical-propagation portions of the hypotheses are
extended.
An example of an extension of the previously-shown hybrid hypothesis is depicted
in Figure 5.5, when new symptoms in EGT and EPR are detected. Draphys attempts
to functionally propagate from the combustor. It is able to extend the hypothesis to
the turbines and to the EGT and EPR sensors. Since this accounts for all the new
symptoms, Draphys stops extension of the hypothesis.
If extending the hybrid hypothesis in the manner described does not account for all
the symptoms, then it would be treated as a multiple fault situation.
Hypothesis Composition
We claim that hypothesis composition is a rational, incremental, and reasonably efficient
approach to explaining complex fault behavior for faults that propagate in multiple
models. The composition is only done when a single model cannot account for all
symptoms, but it uses hypotheses created when those single-model hypotheses were
explored. Moreover, the composition is not done randomly, but rather uses a heuristic
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to limit the search for compositions. As we show in the next chapter in the evaluation
of Draphys on actual accident cases, this heuristic applies in several cases.
Other Aspects of Fault Propagation
Other combinations of fault propagation behavior can occur, of course. Sometimes
functional propagation results in physical propagation, which might happen when an oil
leak results in bearings overheating, causing physical damage to adjacent components.
Draphys currently does not implement such a heuristic.
If we want to provide more specific information about the physical propagation
behavior, we could extend the current implementation by including knowledge about
what is propagating and the associated behavioral differences. For example, a propa-
gating physical object might be something rigid that is not likely to break up (like a fan
blade) or something that disintegrates (like a bird ingested into the engine). Similarly,
the type of "stuff" propagating might provide information about the distance (within a
model) of propagation. For example, heat would propagate differently than a physical
object or an electrical charge.
Providing such information might be beneficial by improving predictive capability
and determination of fault severity levels. However, there are also costs associated with
it. The physical structure model would have to include more information about the
types of physical dependencies between components and thus the reasoning would be-
come more complex. An improved corrective response may be generated, but this would
increase the computational and representational complexity. The tradeoff between costs
and benefits would have to be evaluated.
5.3 General Discussion
The approach described here provides a structure for relaxing assumptions associated
with fault classes. The contribution to defining fault classes is the addition of specificity
as a criterion. These fault classes provide a means of organizing the hypothesis space
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into subspaces. We argue that this approach supports robust diagnostic problem solv-
ing, by allowing the diagnostic process to move to a new subspace when previous spaces
fail to provide hypotheses. In the following sections, we discuss some general issues as-
sociated with the overall approach to designing fault classes in this manner. These
issues include defining fault classes, the order in which fault classes are processed, and
control of the diagnostic process. We also discuss constructive problem solving, because
the hypothesis composition process is constructive in nature.
5.3.1 Defining Fault Classes
When we define a fault class in Draphys, we are identifying the set of hypotheses at a
particular level of detail with a specified type of fault behavior. That is, we define fault
classes according to what we know about the fault and its behavior. If one considers
the diagnosis process as a search through a space where the elements of the space are
fault hypotheses, these fault classes represent a partitioning of that hypothesis space.
The fault classes in Draphys are not totally independent. For example, at the
specific level of status abstraction, the associational knowledge represents the set of
known, functionally propagating faults. We say they are known faults because we
know the specific qualitative symptoms associated with that fault. This fault class
contains hypotheses which are more specific instances of the functional-propagation
faults that represent a fault class at the higher status abstraction level. Interestingly,
all the faults for which we had specific knowledge were functional-propagation faults, so
there were no fault classes containing specific instances of the other single-fault classes.
In Figure 5.6, we show the relationships among the fault classes diagnosed in the current
implementation of Draphys.
5.3.2 Order of Fault Class Processing
When diagnosing a fault, Draphys checks for membership in each class by traversing
the diagnosis taxonomy (shown in Figure 5.7) in a depth-first fashion. The ordering
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of fault classes is based primarily on fault likelihood, but it also simplifies the reason-
ing by allowing later fault classes (in particular, the hybrid-propagation fault class) to
build on reasoning done in previously-explored fault classes. Functionally-propagating
faults, whether described specifically or at the higher abstraction level, occur more
often than faults involving physical damage. This seems reasonable, especially since
functional propagation paths represent intended interactions, and physical propaga-
tion paths represent unintended interactions. Draphys checks for physical propagation
(only) before checking for hybrid propagation in multiple models, because it is more
likely that a fault is detected before it propagates in more than one model. The rea-
soning about hybrid-propagation hypot-heses uses the primitive hypotheses created in
the previously-explored fault classes. Lastly, multiple faults are least likely of all. In
the current approach at least, if valid hypotheses can be identified in a fault class, we
assume that there is no need to consider less likely fault classes. The less common fault
classes can be examined later, if new information eliminates the current hypotheses.
This assumes that all hypotheses in one class have the same likelihood compared to all
hypotheses in another class, and that we only want the most likely hypotheses. This
is a domain-specific choice, which may differ for another domain than the one under
consideration.
We are not restricted to this order of processing, however. We can consider two
aspects of the order of fault class processing, moving between levels of abstraction and
moving among fault classes within a level of abstraction. In the first aspect, we start at
the specific level and move up a level of abstraction when necessary. We could also first
reason about the fault classes at the abstract level of reasoning and refine the resulting
hypotheses according to our specific knowledge.
This abstract-to-specific approach has several advantages. It is a potentially efficient
way of grouping the specific knowledge, so that the search process is more efficient. This
is particularly true if there is a large amount of specific knowledge. If, however, the
amount of specific knowledge is not large, or it can be processed very efficiently, the
additional reasoning at the abstract level may not be worth the pruning advantage that
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it gives.
Another potential advantage of an abstract-to-specific approach might occur when
the time for diagnostic reasoning is limited. Since the reasoning at the abstract level
is less detailed, it may take less time than reasoning at the specific level, especially if
there is a large amount of specific fault knowledge. Therefore, it could generate useful
information in less time than it takes to reason with specific knowledge. Indeed, if the
time available for diagnosis ends before the specific level has been processed, useful
diagnosis information has still been generated.
Moving between fault classes within an abstraction level is now ordered according
to likelihood. This assumes that all faults in a particul_ class are more likely than any
faults in a class considered later. Other means of ordering the fault classes are possible,
such as ordering them by criticality. In Section 5.3.4, we briefly discuss one means of
choosing a fault class to consider based on the localization process.
The order in which fault classes are processed can have an effect on the reasoning
necessary to generate or identify hypotheses in that fault class. For example, the
fault class at the higher level of status abstraction whlch looks for hybrid propagation
performs composition of hypotheses that were constructed when prior fault classes were
explored. That is, it composes hypotheses created in the functional-propagation and
physical-propagation classes. By doing so, it takes advantage of computation clone
previously. If the order of fault class processing were changed, then the reasoning
within that class may have to change, also.
5,3.3 Reasoning in the Component Hierarchies
Levels in the component hierarchies (both functional and physical) used for localization
are levels of structural abstraction, where the primitive components are aggregated into
subsystems at progressively higher levels. Many diagnostic approaches use such levels
of structural abstraction to perform hierarchical diagnosis, generating hypotheses at
each level in the component hierarchy and progressively refining them.
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We chose not to do thisin Draphys, because we cannot use thisapproach with
hybrid propagation. To understand thispoint,considerthe functionaland physical
component hierarchies.The rulesfororganizingsubsystems are differentfor the two
hierarchies,sinceone isbased on functionalrelationshipsamong components and one
isbased on physicallocation.Therefore,the subsystems in the hierarchiesare quite
differentfrom each other,except at the lowestlevel,sincethe primitivecomponents
are the same in both hierarchies.Since the subsystems are not compatible between
hierarchies,compositionof hypothesescannot be done above the primitivecomponent
level.
5.3.4 Control of the Diagnosis Process
As implemented in Draphys, the order of fault class processing is fixed. One possible
future enhancement might be to make the control more opportunistic. We might modify
the control so that fault classes are explored according to the current fault behavior,
rather than in order of likelihood. The localization process may be useful as a means
of indicating the fault behavior and, thus, the appropriate fault class. For example,
if we can localize a fault to a single subsystem in the physical component hierarchy
but not the functionM component hierarchy, we can bypass the class of functionally
propagating faults. To do this, the notion of what it means to localize in one hierarchy
but not another would have to be clarified. Moreover, we cannot identify the fault class
involving multiple models this way, since a single component hierarchy will not suffice
for localization.
Updating hypotheses is another control issue. At present, Draphys updates hypothe-
ses when new symptom information arrives. This new information is used to determine
whether the old valid hypotheses are consistent with the new symptoms. Therefore,
the diagnostic process is only triggered when new symptoms arrive. However, lack of
symptoms can be useful in pruning hypotheses, when expected behavior does not occur.
If this capability were added, the diagnostic process would have to be triggered more
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often, rather than just when symptoms occur. At a minimum, the diagnostic process
would be triggered at the end of an interval when an expected symptom should have
occurred.
5.3.5 Constructive Problem Solving
As discussed in previous chapters, constructive problem solving is the assembly of a
solution, in contrast to classification problem solving, which is the choice of a solution
from a set of pre-enumerated solutions. This assembly might construct the solution
as a subset of existing knowledge, as in diagnosis of functional propagation faults,
where the generator creates subgraphs of the graph describing the functional model.
The assembly might synthesize pieces of knowledge from various sources, such as the
hypothesis composition in Draphys, or in constraint propagation.
Draphys uses simulation to focus the hypothesis assembly process, but there are
certainly other ways to do it. The simulation-based constructive approach makes sense
for operative diagnosis of physical systems such as aircraft subsystems, because we have
the knowledge of expected propagation behavior.
When is it appropriate to use constructive Versus classification problem solving?
The constructive approach is better when the problem solving must be done often, but
the solutions are not that different. This occurs in cases such as operative diagnosis,
because the time-varying nature of fault propagation means that the hypotheses for two
consecutive time snapshots often will only differ by the amount of additional abnormal
behavior caused by the fault.
Formulating a problem as a constructive problem solving task is more appropriate
when the pre-enumerated solutions would have much redundant information in them,
and a single theory exists from which these solutions could be constructed (e.g., a
model). This is analogous to the distinction made by Davis and King in [14], where they
discuss how a production system is not very appropriate for the class of problems where
unifying principles emphasize the similarities in seemingly different states. Similarly,
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classification problem solving is not as appropriate because we have the model as the
unifying theory for creating the hypotheses.
A constructive approach is better when a desired hypotheses comes from pieces of
multiple sources of knowledge. An example of this is the hypothesis composition in
Draphys. Neither model of the device is sufficient to provide an explanation of all the
faulted system behavior, but the use of two models and heuristics to describe the type
of interaction between them is enough to explain many fault situations.
5.3.6 Diagnosing Multiple Independent Faults
We describedthe classesofsinglefault.Another faultclassto consideristhat ofmul-
tipleindependent faults.Although thishas not yet been completely implemented, a
logicalextensionto Draphys' approach fordiagnosingmultipleindependent faultscould
be done by composing hypotheses.This alsoneed not be done randomly, although it
would certainlybe done differentlyfrom the single-fault,hybrid-propagationhypothe-
ses.First,we need not check compositionsofhypotheses thatwere checked previously
as hybrid propagation. Second, we can look fortwo independent faults,then three,
then four,and so on. Third, we can look for combinations based on the most likely
singlefaults.For example, look for combinations of known faultsbeforelookingfor
combinationsof novelfaults.Another combination might be to lookforthe same type
offailurein similardevices,such as the same kind of failurein multipleengines.2
5.4 Related Work
We discuss two categories of related research. The first is research using multiple models
and in multiple classes of faults. The second is in diagnosis of multiple faults.
2Such a case arose in an L-lOll, which had missing O-rings in MI three engines. This case had a
single cause, that of a maintenance error, but determining that single cause in situ is highly unlikely.
tlowevet, problems having a single cause such as this might be similar in the same kind of component.
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5.4.1 On Using Multiple Models
This need for multiple models when accounting for a particular fault's behavior makes
it necessary to use more than one problem solving approach. Therefore, the question
arises, how do we accommodate the multiple types of reasoning necessary? Simon [57]
proposed a conceptual framework to account for the creative, problem finding aspect
of the ill-structured problem-solving process. Within this framework, methods for the
evocation and synthesis of problem structure alternate with problem solvers of familiar
kinds in the progressive definition, refinement, and eventual solution of problems. He
uses design as an example of such a process, stating: (op cit, p. 190)
The whole design, then, begins to acquire structure by being decomposed
into various problems of component design, and by evoking, as the design pro-
gresses, all kinds of requirements to be applied in testing the design of its com-
ponents. During any short period of time, the architect will find himself working
on a problem which, perhaps beginning in an ill-structured state, soon converts
itself through evocation from memory into a well-structured problem.
Figure 5.8 illustrates the conceptual framework, showing the alternation between a
problem solver working on a well-structured problem, and a recognition system continu-
ally modifying the problem space. Thus two major aspects of the reasoning process are
the problem solver and the noticing-and-evoking mechanism. These two aspects permit
the ill-structured problem to be viewed as a succession of well-structured problems.
We view diagnosis in a similar way. The notice-and-evoking mechanism would iden-
tify when a current fault situation is not among the set of specific diagnostic alternatives
and move to a dlfferent partition of the problem space accordingly. This thesis explores
moving among hypothesis subspaces of the diagnosis problem space to cope with faults
that require different problem solving techniques and models. In short, we cope with
ill-structured diagnosis problems by viewing diagnosis as conducting a search through
a space of spaces.
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Figure 5.8: Schematic Diagram of a System for Ill-Structured Problems (from [57]).
5.4.2 Using Multiple Models for Diagnosis
The most related research on using multiple models, especially for diagnosis, is Davis'
work [11]. He describes both functional and physical structure of a device. He also
describes the advantages to having an ordered set of fault categories, which are similar
to our fault classes. He discusses the notion of simplifying assumptions that correspond
to each fault category, and that exploring the categories is a matter of making and
retracting assumptions. He identified the adjacency principle as a mechanism for deter-
mining which model of the physical system to use; the correct model is one in which the
paths of causal interaction are adjacent. Moreover, he assumes that there is no action
at a distance, and finding the paths of interaction is a matter of finding the right type
of adjacency.
Obviously, this thesis research applies the principles that Davis described. His fault
categories are based on assumptions about adjacency. Draphys' fault classes are similar
in that they are based on assumptions which are successively relaxed when they fail to
provide a satisfactory hypothesis, and the order in which this occurs is determined by
likelihood. However, they differ in the assumptions on which the classes are based. The
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fault classes in Draphys are based on abstraction level and fault propagation behavior.
The notion of fault propagation behavior is analogous to the adjacency assumption,
because the kind of adjacency is the reason a fault propagates the way it does. Moreover,
not all fault classes in Draphys are mutually exclusive. The specific, associational
knowledge represents the class of specific, functionally propagating faults (it just so
happened that all the known faults were functional propagation faults). The members of
this class are specific instances of hypotheses in the higher level, functional-propagation
fault class.
Concerning multiple models, Davis uses the example of a bridge fault to illustrate
the use of both functional and physical knowledge. His program, HT, uses functional
knowledge to generate candidates for the source of the problem. When HT determines
that no single fault could account for the symptoms in the functional model, it looks for
pairs of physically adjacent components among the candidates that might have a bridge
between them. That basic idea, of looking at interaction via paths in a different model,
is quite powerful. Draphys also implements that idea, but in a different way. Draphys
systematically composes hypotheses based on knowledge about how faults propagate
in different models. The composition process uses previously created hypotheses to
incrementally create the composite hypotheses. The composite hypotheses can also be
incrementally updated when new symptoms appear as the fault continues to propagate.
5.4.3 On Diagnosing Multiple Faults
Although not yet implemented, some obvious extensions to this research for diagnosis
of multiple faults exist. We could look at combinations of single-fault hypotheses,
using the approach implemented in GDE and described in [16], although that and
other approaches for multiple-fault diagnosis do not at present reason about different
classes of faults, and do not use different models. For example, they treat faults which
propagate physically as multiple faults, because they do not have the model that would
allow them to diagnose it as a single fault. However, GDE could be expanded to
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accommodate such reasoning.
5.5 Limitations
Although this research has expanded the capability of existing diagnostic systems, there
are still fault classes we cannot diagnose. These include intermittent faults, design
faults, and so on. Moreover, we cannot rank the hypotheses that we have within a fault
class. We also do not include any notion of time duration in our temporal reasoning;
we have abstracted it away because we do not yet know how to represent it.
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Chapter 6
Evaluation of the Fault Diagnosis Approach
This chapter includes two types of evaluation of the diagnostic approach. The first is
an experimental evaluation of the implemented system on actual accident cases. The
second is an analytical evaluation that includes a credit assignment analysis and a
knowledge degradation analysis. In the analysis of credit assignment, we discuss the
characteristics of the approach that are responsible for its success. We describe the
constraints on the design of the diagnostic approach and guidelines for the design of
the models. In the analysis of knowledge degradation, we describe the consequences of
incompleteness or of elimination of types of knowledge in Draphys.
6.1 Experimental Evaluation
This section describes the experimental evaluation of the diagnostic approach on actual
aircraft accident cases involving single engine faults. First, we discuss the experiment
design and the reconstruction of the accident cases. The resulting diagnosis for each
accident is then presented and discussed.
6.1.1 Approach
Eight official National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports on accident cases
were found involving single faults in turbine engines in commercial transport aircraft.
These cases were collected at the beginning of this research. This set of cases was divided
into two sets. One set of four cases was put aside for the experimental evaluation and
was not examined for the design of Draphys. The other four, together with reports on
engine-related problems that did not result in accidents, were used in Draphys' design.
111
Whenthe prototype of Draphys was complete, a colleague who was unfamiliar with
the design of the diagnosis system reconstructed all eight accident cases and generated
the symptoms that occurred in the accidents) Although this colleague was unfamiliar
with the diagnostic process, he was familiar with the operation of the fault monitor
which provides inputs to Draphys. He reconstructed the symptoms as though they
were produced by the fault monitor. These reconstructed symptoms were presented to
Draphys as input, and the resulting hypotheses are presented below.
Before discussing the results, some of the limitations of the reconstruction must be
explicated. Numerical sensor data from the engine parameters was not available, so the
symptoms were reconstructed based on the descriptions in the NTSB analysis of each
accident. The symptoms in the report were usually those described by the flight crew,
who normally will not detect deviations in sensor readings as soon as the fault monitor
does. Therefore, the sequence of symptoms could not always be determined completely,
because the flight crew only noticed a problem when several sensors were symptomatic.
In several fault cases it appears that the sensors became symptomatic simultaneously,
which is not very likely. IIowever, the symptoms as described by the crew were used.
Another limitation on the reconstruction was because not all engine faults occurred
in the same type of turbine engine. The design of Draphys is based on a Pratt and
Whitney JT8D-7 engine, but many of the failures occurred in other models of turbine
engines. The reconstruction process generated the symptoms as though the engine were
the JT8D-7. The engines were similar enough qualitatively that this did not create a
problem. For diagnosis, the main differences between engines were the sensors available.
Several turbine engines have vibration sensors. However, the vibration sensors are
notoriously inaccurate, and many airlines disable them. The different engines did not
greatly affect the diagnosis because the diagnostic process depends on qualitative models
and symptoms. If we were evaluating the fault monitor, which uses quantitative models,
we would need numerical sensor data and we would need to examine fault cases for the
11am indebted to Paul Schutte for reconstructing the accident cases and doing the initial evaluation
as described in [54].
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JT8D-7 only.
6.1.2 Results
In this section, we present the results of the experimental evaluation. Table 6.1 presents
a summary of the hypotheses, without system status or propagation path, produced for
the test cases used as test input. We discuss each test case individually, and its results;
we then discuss the major points brought out by the analysis of the results.
Before we begin describing the results, we first must define a successful diagnosis.
In this evaluation, we define a successful diagnosis to be one in which the correct
hypothesis (the actual cause as identified by the NTSB) is among the set of valid
hypotheses produced, and that the remaining hypotheses were such that they were a
reasonable explanation of the situation, given the data available.
While this may not appear to be a particularly stringent definition, it is consistent
with the goal of this thesis research. That is, we are concerned with producing useful
diagnostic information, even in the presence of novel faults. Therefore, it was important
to the goal of this research to be able to generate a correct hypothesis, even for a novel
fault. If we generated a correct hypothesis, we considered that a success. Moreover,
since we cannot rank hypotheses, we could not test Draphys' ability to choose the
correct hypothesis. Also because of our goal, we made the design decision of preferring
false positive hypotheses (hypotheses which said that a component had failed when it
actually had not) to false negatives (not producing a hypothesis for a component which
actually is at fault). In all the cases, Draphys never produced more than six valid
hypotheses.
Note that both status abstraction levels were invoked in all cases, in order to test
the diagnostic reasoning at each level. In each case, the lower abstraction level was
invoked first. For evaluation purposes, even when this level produced hypotheses, the
higher level also was invoked.
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Table 6.1: Summary of Hypotheses (Without System Status) Produced by Accident
Case Analysis
Case Description Stage 1 Hypotheses Stage 2 Hypotheses
1. Turbine Blade
Separation
i, Turbine Blade Separation
2. Flameout
I. Fan
2. Compressor
3. Combustor
4. Turbine
2. Fan Failure I, Turbine Blade Separation I. Fan
3. Fan Failure I. Turbine Blade Separation i. Fan
4. ForeiEn Object none
Ingestion
I. Fan
2. Compressor
3. Combustor
4. Turbine
S. Massive Rain I. Flameout I. Combustor
2. Turbine Blade Separation 2. Turbine
6. Engine Separation i. Fuel System Failure
2. Flameout
i. Engine - Fan
7. Turbine Disk
Separation
1. Turbine Blade Separation I. Combustor
2. Turbine
8. Bearin$ failure I. Flameout i. Compressor
2. Turbine Blade Separation
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Case 1 - Turbine Blade Separation
On July 19, 1970, a United Airlines Boeing 737-222 (Flight 611) crashed shortly after
taking off from the Philadelphia International Airport [30]. During takeoff, the number
1 engine failed. The captain thought that both engines were failing. Therefore, he
decided to reject the takeoff and land the a lrcrat"t on the existing runway. The aircraft
came to a stop past the end of the runway. The NTSB determined that a first stage
turbine blade had failed in the number 1 engine which caused the engine to cease
rotation. The number 2 engine was operable throughout the flight. The probable cause
of the accident was determined to be the captain's inappropriate decision to reject the
takeoff and land the aircraft based on his lack of understanding of the true state of the
aircraft.
The first stage 2 of Draphys's diagnosis process produced two hypotheses, namely
"Turbine Blade Separation" and "Flame-out" for engine number 1. The first hypothesis
was correct. The second hypothesis was also correct even though flame out was caused
by the turbine blade separation. The second stage produced four hypotheses, one for
each major component of the engine, namely the fan, the compressor, the combustor
and the turbine. Since all the engine sensors became symptomatic simtiltaneously,
stage 2 could not distinguish one as the source of the problem. The stage 2 diagnosis
contained one correct hypothesis and three false-positive hypotheses. It is improbable
that all the engine sensors would have become symptomatic at once; however, this was
the only information available from the NTSB report. If a more realistic simulation of
this accident could have been produced, the second stage might have pruned some of
the false-positive hypotheses.
A decision aid such as Draphys may have helped to avoid this accident. The ac-
cident occurred because the pilot was confused about which engine had failed. The
interface design which has already been implemented in Draphys could have reduced
2Note that the first diagnosis stage refers to reasoning at the lower abstraction level, and the second
diagnosis stage is the reasoning at the higher abstraction level.
115
the ambiguity between the two engines. The correct diagnosis of the turbine blade
separation might not have been useful until the aircraft landed; however, the correct
locMization of the failure was crucial to the safety of the flight.
Case 2 - Fan Failure
On November 3, 1973, a National Airlines DC-10-10 (Flight 27) suffered an engine
failure and made an emergency landing at Albuquerque International Airport [31]. The
engine fan assembly of the number 3 engine disintegrated and its fragments penetrated
the fuselage, the number 1 and number 2 engine nacelles, and the right wing area.
The resultant damage caused the loss of certain electrical and hydraulic subsystems.
The NTSB determined that the probable cause was the disintegration of the number
3 engine fan assembly as a result of an interaction between the fan blade tips and the
fan case.
Stage 1 of Draphys produced a false-positive hypothesis of "Turbine Blade Sepa-
ration." There is no fault in the set of fault-symptom associations which corresponds
to a fan blade failure. "Turbine Blade Separation" was triggered because of certain
similarities in the symptoms for "Turbine Blade Separation" and "Fan Failure." This
problem could be corrected by extending the fault-symptom association set to handle
fan failures. Before the stage 1 diagnosis, stage 2 of Draphys correctly hypothesized
a problem in the engine fan. Stage 2 tracked the fault propagation into the hydraulic
line. Were Draphys implemented for all aircraft subsystems, more of the propagation
may have been evident.
This case raises an interesting point regarding physical propagation paths in the
stage 2 model of the physical structure. All the physical propagation paths on the
aircraft are stated explicitly within the stage 2 physical system model. As mentioned
above, fragments of the number 3 engine (a wing mounted engine) penetrated the num-
ber 1 engine nacelle (mounted on the opposite wing). This physical propagation is
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highly unlikely and probably would not have been explicitly modeled in a fully imple-
mented system. Draphys would have treated any symptoms in engine 1 as resulting
from a separate fault, totally unrelated to fault in engine 3. If every possible physical
propagation path were stated in the model, the generation of hypotheses would be very
extensive and therefore, very slow. Also, the pruning of hypotheses would be very dif-
ficult. Therefore, the practical option is to only state those propagation paths which
are likely, and treat unlikely propagations as multiple faults.
Case 3 - Fan Failure
On January 31, 1981, a Northwest Airlines DC-10-40 (Flight 79) suffered an engine
failure after departing from Dulles International Airport, ChantiUy, Virginia [35]. The
NTSB determined that the probable cause of the incident was the failure of a fan blade
in the number 3 engine. The failure of the fan blade led to the inflight separation of
the nose cowl assembly and the fan containment case.
Stage 1 of Draphys again produced a false-positive hypothesis of "Turbine Blade
Separation." The symptom set needed to trigger "Turbine Blade Separation" is very
small and therefore, this association is very sensitive. Stage 2 correctly named the fan
as the responsible component, and showed propagation throughout the other engine
components.
This case is similar to Case 2 above in that a fan failure triggered the "Turbine
Blade Separation" hypothesis in stage 1. These two cases demonstrate the need to add
a "Fan Failure" fault to the stage i fault symptom associations.
Case 4 - Foreign Object Ingestion
On November 12, 1975, an Overseas National Airways DC-10-30 (Flight 32) crashed
while attempting to take off from John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica,
New York [32]. During the takeoff roll a large number of sea gulls rose from the runway
and were ingested into the engine. The number 3 engine disintegrated. The takeoff
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was rejectedand the aircraftcrashedoffthe end ofthe runway. The NTSB determined
that the probable cause of the accidentwas the disintegrationand subsequent firein
the number 3 engine when itingesteda largenumber ofsea gulls.
There was no diagnosisproduced from the firststageofDraphys even though one of
the faultsin the fault-symptom associationis"ForeignObject Ingestion."The reason
that thisfaultwas not triggeredwas that the symptoms in the associationcorrespond
to a lightingestionin which the engine continuesto operate during ingestion.In
thistestcasehowever, the massiveingestionalmost immediately destroyedthe engine.
Therefore,the symptoms were different,qualitativelyand quantitatively,from a light
ingestion.Stage 2 produced fourseparatehypotheses,naming each of the followingas
the responsiblecomponents: the fan,the compressor,the combustion section,or the
turbine.The reasonthatallfourof the major enginecomponents were hypothesizedas
the responsiblecomponent isbecause symptoms occurred on allmajor engine sensors
simultaneously.Stage 2 did not have enough informationto prune the hypotheses.
There are severalnoteworthy pointsconcerningthistestcase.One isthat the same
fault may manifest itself in different ways depending on the severity of the fault and the
ambient conditions. Another point concerns the second stage of the diagnosis process
and the fault monitoring stage. If the monitor could discern which sensor became
symptomatic first, instead of reporting that they all became symptomatic at once, the
second stage could reduce the number of hypotheses in its diagnosis. Finally, this test
case demonstrates that there will always be failures which the system cannot completely
diagnose; however, it does provide as much information to the flight crew as possible.
In other words, the system provides a graceful degradation of information instead of
simply providing no information, when it cannot completely determine the cause of the
failure.
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Case 5 - Massive Water Ingestion
On April 4, 1977 a Southern Airways DC-9 (Flight 242) crashed in New Hope, Georgia
[33]. The aircraft had flown through heavy thunderstorms and had lost both engines.
The crew attempted an emergency landing on a highway and crashed. The NTSB
determined that massive water ingestion into the engines accompanied by thrust lever
movement induced severe stalling in and major damage to the engine compressors. The
NTSB determined that the aircraft might have been able to survive the weather had
the flight crew not made significant movements in the thrust lever.
The first stage of Draphys hypothesized that the failure was either "Turbine Blade
Separation" or "Flame-out" for both engines. This diagnosis was produced after both
engines had failed. "Flame-out" was correct; "Turbine Blade Separation" was a false-
positive hypothesis. Again, there was no association in the set of fault-symptom asso-
ciation which corresponded to "Massive Water Ingestion." Therefore, stage 1 could not
correctly diagnose the original cause of this failure, although it diagnosed "flame-out"
as one of the consequences. Stage 2, however, produced an earlier diagnosis of problems
in either the combustor, turbine or the EPR sensor. This incorrect diagnosis was based
on an early change in EPR which was believed to have occurred before a symptom in
the N2 sensor.
This case identifies an excellent potential benefit of a fully implemented first stage for
both the diagnosis system and recovery planner. The first stage of the diagnosis system
could recognize the symptoms of "Massive Water Ingestion." The recovery planner
could caution the flight crew not to make any significant movements in the throttle
lever.
Case 6 - Engine Separation
On May 25, 1979 an American Airlines DC-10-10 (Flight 191) crashed into an open
field northwest of Chicago-O'Hare International Airport [34]. During takeoff rotation,
the left engine and pylon assembly, and about 3 feet of the leading edge of the left wing
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separated from the aircraft. The aircraft began to roll to the left until the wings were
past the vertical position. During the roll, the aircraft's nose pitched down below the
horizon and crashed. The NTSB determined that the probable cause of this accident
was the asymmetrical stall and the ensuing roll of the aircraft at a critical point dur-
ing takeoff. This was caused by the uncommanded retraction of the left wing outboard
leading edge slats and the loss of the stall warning and slat disagreement indication sys-
tems resulting from separation of the number 1 engine and pylon assembly. The NTSB
determined that the accident would have been survivable had the flight crew known
that the stall warning and the slat disagreement indication systems were inoperative.
This case was actually a multiple fault, in that multiple primitive components failed
simultaneously. Since Draphys does not yet have multiple-fault diagnosis capability, it
does not truly evaluate this particular case. This case is analyzed below, while taking
this factor into consideration.
Both stages of Draphys produced diagnoses for this failure. The first stage produced
two hypotheses, namely "Fuel System Failure" and "Flame-out." The hypothesis of
"Flame-out" is most appropriate since the fault-symptom association dictionary does
not include a fault of "Engine Loss." The second stage hypothesized a physical propa-
gation from an engine failure (specifically the engine fan) to the hydraulic subsystem.
This too was the correct diagnosis since the critical information needed by the crew
was the loss of thrust and the propagation to the hydraulic system. The diagnosis
hypothesized that the responsible component was the fan because the only component
in the stage 2 model of our aircraft with a physical adjacency to the hydraulic line was
the fan.
Again, the significance of this case is that the second stage recognized that the
abnormal sensor readings from the hydraulic system sensors were not the result of a
separate failure in the hydraulic system but a physical propagation from an engine
failure. This demonstrates the concept of recognizing fault propagation between func-
tionally unrelated aircraft systems. Were Draphys implemented for all the aircraft
sensors, it probably could have determined that the stall warning system and the slat
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disagreement indicator were possibly inoperative because of fault propagation from the
engine separation. As indicated above, this information might have greatly increased
the crew's ability to compensate for the failure and survive the failure.
This case highlights an important consideration. A fault which may be a single
fault at a given level in the component hierarchy (as in the subsystems level here,
where our diagnosis was successful) can be a multiple fault at the next level down in
the component hierarchy. Therefore, identifying a fault as single or multiple fault may
depend greatly on the definition of the primitive components.
Case 7 - Turbine Disk Separation
On September 22, 1981, an Air Florida Airlines DC-10-30CF (Flight 2198) suffered a
failure in the number 3 engine during takeoff at Miami International Airport, Miami,
Florida [36]. The takeoff was rejected. The engine disintegrated and the resultant
debris damaged the right wing outboard leading edge slat. Components of the number
1 and number 3 hydraulic systems were also damaged by engine debris. The NTSB
determined that the probable cause of the accident was presence of foreign material in
the low pressure turbine cavity. The foreign material damaged connecting bolts in the
engine, and when these bolts failed the low pressure turbine disk separated from the
its rotor assembly, oversped, and burst.
Stage 1 of Draphys hypothesized this fault as "Turbine Blade Separation." This
diagnosis was correct in the sense that all the blades and the disk itself separated.
There is no fault for "Turbine Disk Separation" in the stage I fault-symptom association
dictionary. The second stage diagnosis hypothesized either the turbine, combustor, or
the EPR sensor as being the responsible component. The reason that the second stage
could not solely identify the turbine as the responsible component is that there is no
specific sensor monitoring the turbine; therefore, it must base its hypotheses on EPR
and EGT information.
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Case 8 - Bearing Failure
On September 22, 1981 an Eastern AirlinesL-1011 (Flight935) experienceda failure
inthe number 2 enginewhich forcedan emergency landingat John F. Kennedy Inter-
nationalAirport,Jamaica, New York [37].Beforethe failure,abnormal sensorreadings
occurred in the N2 sensorof the number 2 engine. The pilotreduced the throttleon
the number 2 engine and itreturned to normal. Later,the enginedisintegrated.The
NTSB determined thatthe probable cause was the thermallyinduced degradationand
consequent failureof the number 2 engine low pressurebearing because ofinadequate
lubrication.After the number 2 enginewas lost,the A, B, and D hydraulicsystems
failed.
Stage 1 of Draphys hypothesizedthe problem as being either"Flame-out" or "Tur-
bine Blade Separation.""Turbine Blade Separation"was incorrect."Flame-out" was
accurateafterthefailure.There isno faultforinadequatelubricationorengineoverheat
inthe stage 1 setoffault-association.Stage 2 of Draphys' diagnosissystem detecteda
problem with the number 2 enginebeforethe engine failed.The hypothesiswas that
the compressor was malfunctioning.As time progressed,the second stagetrackedthe
propagationof thefailureintothe combustor,the turbine,and the fanas wellas the NI,
N2, EGT, and EPR sensors.From the fan,stagetwo trackeda physicalpropagation
to the hydrauliclinewhich isnear the fan.In reality,the hydrauliclinewas cut by a
compressor blade. This hypothesiswas produced because thereisno physicallinkin
the model between the compressor and the hydraulicline.Again thisisa deficiency
in the model which the second stageusesand not in the reasoningconcept.In section
6.2.2,we discussthe generalimplicationsof missingor incomplete knowledge in the
models. Ifthere were a physicallinkin the model between the compressor and the
hydraulicline,stage2 would have hypothesizedthe correctphysicalpropagationofthe
fault.
While the propagation path in the hypothesisfrom stage 2 may not be exactly
correct,itdoes containimportant information(i.e.,the failurehas propagated to the
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hydraulicsystem). Moreover,the remainder ofthe hypothesis,identifyingthe respon-
siblecomponent and the system status,iscorrect.
6.1.3 Discussion
The implications of the results for both the first stage (the specific fault-symptom
associations) and the second stage of diagnosis (the reasoning at the higher level of
status abstraction) are discussed below. For each stage, we consider the false-positive
hypotheses produced and the research areas that still need to be explored.
Concerning false-positive hypotheses, two types are possible. In the first type of
false-positive hypothesis, the diagnosis process identifies a component as the source of
the problem, and a corresponding system status, that cannot be ruled out based on
the current symptoms. The second type of false positive is one that could be ruled
out if the system were smarter. Draphys produced false-positive hypotheses of the
first type, where each hypothesis was a reasonable possible explanation of the current
symptoms, and none of the second type. That is, all the false-positive hypotheses were
such that they were a reasonable explanation of the situation, given the data available,
even though post-crash analysis ruled it out based on closer examination of the physical
components.
The results from the test cases identified three areas of research and development
for the first stage, containing the specific fault-symptom associations. First, the fault-
symptom association dictionary needs to be expanded, and, as discussed in Chapter 3, a
new representation considered. The second area involves a refinement of the first stage
hypothesis validation process. As mentioned above, there were 4 incorrect hypotheses.
Each of these hypotheses was a false-positive hypothesis of "Turbine Blade Separation."
This particular fault-symptom association can be triggered by many different sequences
of symptoms. At present, stage 1 validates a hypothesis if all the symptoms which are
characteristic of that fault are present. However, the fault hypothesized does not have
to account for all the symptoms present as in stage 2. If this second criteria were placed
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on stage 1 hypotheses, "Turbine Blade Separation" (as it is currently characterized in
the fault-symptom association) would not have been triggered as often as it was in these
test cases. The third area involves refining the fanlt-symptom associations to be more
clearly and carefully defined. The repeated hypotheses of "Turbine Blade Separation"
indicate that the fault-symptom association may not accurately describe this fault.
Stage 2 of the diagnosis process, the reasoning at the higher level of status abstrac-
tion, was considered to be very successful, even though all aspects of the hypotheses
were not always correct as determined by the NTSB. There were two factors which lim-
ited the diagnosis success. The first was that the model of the physical and functional
structure had some limitation which prevented an accurate diagnosis. The second fac-
tor involved the reconstruction of the test cases for simulation. As mentioned earlier
in discussing the limitations of the reconstruction, some information was absent from
the NTSB reports. This information should normally be available from the Draphys
monitor. This information could improve the hypotheses generated by the second stage
of Draphys.
Concerning execution time, the computer code was not optimized in any way. It
was executed on a Symbolics 3650, written in Common LISP and Flavors, and was
interpreted, not compiled. The physical system model represented approximately 40
components and 100 interconnections (both the functional and physical dependencies).
The execution time was not measured precisely, but seemed reasonably efficient. In all
cases the diagnosis was done in less than ten seconds, and often took less than that.
This evaluation demonstrates that the Draphys concept shows promise for perform-
ing diagnosis of physical systems in operation. However, further development would be
useful to enhance the present implementation. The implementation should be expanded
to include other subsystems in the aircraft, since most failures are rarely confined to
the engine and hydraulic subsystems. Also, the subsystems now included should be de-
scribed in more detail to handle a greater complexity of failures. This increased depth
could allow improved flight crew procedures for handling inflight failures. Another de-
sirable enhancement is the capability to handle multiple failures. The test cases above
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wereall single failures; however, many accidents are the result of multiple failures.
6.2 Analytical Evaluation
This section first discusses why this diagnostic approach works, and what characteristics
give it its power, particularly at the higher abstraction level. The cost of violating the
constraints on these characteristics, and the cost of eliminating types of knowledge, are
also discussed.
6.2.1 Credit Assignment
Why does Draphys work? The answer lies mainly in three aspects of the approach: the
monitoring that identifies the symptoms, the simulation of fault propagation, and the
system models used. The following section discusses why the success of the approach
depends on these three aspects, a_d the consequences of not having them.
The Symptoms
The entire diagnostic reasoning approach depends on the symptoms identifying when
the parameters become abnormal. By identifying when parameters values differ from
their expected values, the propagation of the fault's effects can be identified. This
differs substantially from the monitoring systems currently operational for aircraft sys-
tems (or many other systems a_ well). Current operational systems identify when a
parameter exceeds its total operating range, which can be a broad range. In contra_t,
the symptoms produced by Draphys' fault monitor axe identified as soon as the param-
eter differs from its expected value (with allowances for sensor noise, etc.), even if the
parameter is still within its normal operating range. This detects abnormalities sooner
than a monitor that waits for the signal to exceed its proper range.
Not having the ability to identify abnormal parameters as soon as they become
abnormal may restrict the applicability of this diagnostic approach. The simulation of
fault propagation depends on knowing when signals become abnormal. If the order in
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which the signals exceed their operating range is the same order in which they become
abnormal (which will not necessarily be the case), the diagnostic approach will still
produce correct information, but it will not be as timely and the effects of the fault
probably will have propagated extensively.
There are disadvantages in requiring the symptoms to satisfy this requirement.
Determining when parameters differ from their expected value requires a model to
calculate what those expected values are. It may be difficult to obtain a numerical
simulation model for some systems. It may also be that in some systems, such as digital
circuits, using the expected binary inputs and outputs will not provide the abnormality
information necessary to track the propagation of the fault. For example, if one input
to an AND gate is zero and the other input is potentially faulty, it is impossible to tell
whether the effect of the fault has reached that far, because the output will be zero.
Moreover, sensor noise and mismodeling are also concerns.
Simulation
This diagnostic approach within the higher abstraction level is considered to be a
simulation-based approach to generating hypotheses because the fault propagation be-
havior is simulated to construct hypotheses. Other approaches could be taken to con-
struct hypotheses, such as, tracing backwards along the dependency links to find a
single "parent" in the graph that describes the physical system. However, this graph is
complex, since the physical system it describes has feedback, among other behavioral
complexities.
The simulation-based approach is parsimonious, in that it focuses attention quickly
on the candidate elements needed to construct a hypothesis. By doing this, the search
for constructed hypotheses is pruned in a very knowledge-intensive manner. Moreover,
the simulation enables incremental updating of hypotheses. This aspect allows very
efficient use of new information when it becomes available, and facilitates the pruning
or confirmation of hypotheses.
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The simulation-based approach has several disadvantages. One of these is that a
model is necessary to do the simulation. As we will discuss in the next section, the
models must be carefully defined. Not having a model defined appropriately for the class
of faults under consideration may very well mean that the class cannot be diagnosed
properly.
Another concern is that the lack of sensor information leads to ambiguity in the
simulation, since the extent of the fault cannot always be accurately tracked. The result
is ambiguity in both the system status and in number of hypotheses generated. This
problem will arise with any approach, though, because of limited sensor information.
However, the implication for the simulation-based approach is that the reasoning must
take into account the relationships among the sensors and non-sensor components.
Another, more major concern is that the definition of a model used for simulation is
inherently based on assumptions. Assumptions must be made to build a model at all.
For example, the functional structure mode] used in Draphys assumes the directionality
of functional interaction is as described. Therefore, if this assumption is violated, the
model can no longer be used to accurately simulate fault propagation behavior for a
class of faults that violate directionality. Davis points out and discusses the issue of
assumptions and their relationship to choice of model in [1 i].
The Models
Because the diagnostic approach is simulation based, the models of the physical system
used in the simulation process are critical to the success of the diagnosis. In the following
discussion, the important characteristics of the models are described, together with the
consequences of not possessing these characteristics.
The functional and physical structure models of the physical system being diagnosed
are defined hierarchically. We first discuss the necessary characteristics of the mode]
within a single level in the component hierarchy; in particular, the primitive component
level. We then discuss the definition of the component hierarchies themselves, or the
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manner in which lower level components must be organized into subsystems.
Choice of Components
The first characteristic we discuss here is the choice of components at the primitive
component level. This addresses two issues: what a component is, and how detailed
our model should be. First, what is a component? A component is a physical part or
set of parts of the device under consideration. A device has any number of components,
depending on how detailed a model is desired. We could conceivably model the device
down to the molecular level, but that is not necessarily desirable or beneficial.
Occam's razor is appropriate for choosing a level of detail for the model. It is un-
desirable to model the device at a greater level of detail than that needed to diagnose
the problem. How the device is divided into components is determined by (1) what
components need to be identified as faulted when they break, (2) whether the com-
ponents can be disambiguated with the sensor placement available, and (3) whether
the components are necessary in the propagation path to determine the propagation of
abnormal status.
We now expand on each of these determining factors. If it is important to identify
when a particular component breaks because, say, it determines or differentiates the
necessary corrective action, then this component should be included in the model.
Hamscher [25] also discusses this, and identifies it as a principle for building models.
If it is not important to identify when a particular part breaks, and none of the other
factors apply, then the component either should not be included in the model or the
model designer should consider aggregating it to the next higher level of detail. For
example, consider the individual fan blades in the fan. It makes no difference when a
particular fan blade breaks, it is only important to know that one of the blades broke.
Therefore, Draphys does not model the individual fan blades.
Another motivation for not modeling the fan blades is that we do not have enough
sensor information to identify individual blades. The cost of modeling at a greater
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level of detail than we have sensor information to discriminate with is ambiguity in
hypotheses. We will have additional hypotheses because we cannot tell them apart.
The third factor is whether the part of the physical system contributes towards
tracking the propagation path. If a component does not satisfy any of the prior criteria,
the model designer should determine whether it can be a factor in the branching of the
propagation path. If a particular component is a branching point in the propagation
path that enables identification of the propagation to other components, it must be
included in the physical system model.
If we leave a part out of the physical system model because of the above factors,
and it breaks and damages another part that is in the physical system, then it is quite
possible that we will suspect the component that is modeled as being the responsible
component. If the action associated with it is the appropriate one, whether that compo-
nent was truly the source of the problem or merely the first one affected, then our goal
for diagnosis is served. Our diagnostic system design choice of preferring false positive
hypotheses over false negative hypotheses may lead to this as a consequence. If the
diagnosis were not for operative systems, this design choice may not be appropriate.
Organization of Subsystems
The localization process as described depends on the subsystems being defined in a
particular way because this grouping into subsystems is important to the pruning ability
of the localization process. The purpose of the localization process is to exonerate sets
of components by pruning whole branches in the component hierarchy. The subsystems
must be defined so that available sensor information can exonerate an entire subsystem
at once. For instance, it is desirable to be able to say that if no engine sensor readings
are symptomatic, then that engine (and by extension, its subcomponents) cannot be
the source of the fault.
To avoid excessive exoneration, the subsystems must be defined so that sensors
"bound" the subsystems by measuring inputs and outputs. It is not usually possible
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Figure 6.1: Inappropriate Subsystem Definition.
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Figure 6.2: Appropriate Subsystem Definition.
130
to have sensor readings on all components, so the readings available must be used to
judiciously organize the subsystems. For example, Figure 6.1 illustrates a subsystem
definition that would not permit exoneration of subsystem-l, even when none of its
sensors are symptomatic. If a symptom on sensor-3 came from the fault monitor, it
may have been caused by a fault in component-3. Thus this subsystem organization will
not support the localization process. Given the same sensors and components organized
as shown in Figure 6.2, localization could be done.
Another consideration is that the boundary sensors must measure a parameter of
the component or subsystem that can exonerate upstream components. To illustrate
this point, consider the fuel temperature sensor in the fuel control subsystem. This
sensor measures the temperature of the fuel in the fuel line. However, the function
of the fuel line is to transmit fuel to the combustion section of the engine. Since this
sensor could be normal when the fuel line has an abnormal operational status, it is not
a good sensor to use for bounding a subsystem.
This last consideration highlights the point that sensors are not always placed in
a manner to support diagnosis. However, one result of this thesis research is that we
can identify some principles, as stated above, for placement of sensors to support the
diagnostic process.
Representing Dependencies in the Models
Simulation of fault propagation follows the dependency links in the particular model
being used; i.e., either physical or functional. Since the successful propagation (or lack
thereof) is critical to the construction of hypotheses, these dependency relationships
must be carefully and accurately defined.
The functional dependency links represent the normal, designed interaction among
components in the physical system. When a fault occurs, the effect of the fault is
expected to propagate along the normal paths of interaction in the functional model.
The effect of the fault propagates because the output of the broken component is
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abnormal and thus the input to dependent components is abnormal However, for the
input given, these dependent components operate properly, since they are not damaged.
This is why the model of normal functional interaction can be used to represent faulted
system behavior as well.
Functional dependency links between two components represents a potential inter-
action based on the normally operating system, but does not mean that there will be
an interaction along this path. Whether a normal interaction occurs or not along a par-
ticular path may depend on specific parameter values that are unavailable at the level
of detail of this model. Therefore, by representing all the potential paths of normal in-
teraction, we can represent even those fault cases where the interaction is not intended
under the current circumstances but which happens anyway. Moreover, because we
simulate propagation of abnormal status, and do not simulate the specific qualitative
values (such as high or low) of the system parameters, we can simulate fault behavior
other than a localized failure of function. While the fault propagates along the normal
functional paths of interaction, we can simulate it in this functional model.
6.2.2 Knowledge Degradation Analysis
The purpose of this analysis is to determine the cost of degradation in knowledge.
To examine knowledge degradation in Draphys, we examine the consequences of not
having a particular type of knowledge or of that knowledge being incomplete. This
is straightforward in Draphys, because the types of knowledge are partitioned as the
fault hypotheses are partitioned. Because types of knowledge are associated with fault
classes, we examine each fault class individually.
In general, not having the type of knowledge associated with a fault class means
that membership of faults in that class cannot be determined. We will examine, for
each fault class, what the resulting diagnoses would be for faults in that class if the
knowledge were not available.
The first class is that of specific known faults. The knowledge associated with this
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class is the knowledge of fault-symptom associations for known, commonly occurring
faults. If this knowledge were not available, then the specific fault hypotheses could not
be generated. If all other knowledge is still in Draphys, the removal of this knowledge
would result in hypotheses being generated at only the abstract level.
The second fault class is that of novel faults which propagate functionally. The
knowledge associated with this class is the functional model of the physical system.
Without this model, the propagation behavior of many faults could not be simulated;
therefore, the fault hypotheses could not be constructed or pruned. If we had a physical
structure model but not the functional structure model, then physical propagation
would be identified but not the functional.
Similarly, when the physical model is unavailable, the physical propagation behavior
cannot be identified. Without the model necessary to identify the physical propagation,
this entire class of faults cannot be identified because the type of behavior cannot be
recognized.
When a hybrid of physical and functional propagation occurs, both models are
needed. In the fault class that includes all hybrid propagation, missing either form
of knowledge (physical or functional) will result in the fault appearing to be a differ-
ent fault class, that of multiple faults of the single propagation type. For instance,
consider the fault shown earlier where physical propagation occurred from the fan to
the hydraulic line and subsequent functional propagation occurred in each. Without a
physical model, this fault appears to be two independent functional-propagation faults,
one originating in the fan and one originating in the hydraulic line. However, other
combinations may appear to be possible, such as a fan fault and a hydraulic pressure
sensor fault.
Lastly, if we did not know how to diagnose multiple faults, then any fault whose
behavior did not belong to any of the single fault classes would cause the diagnosis to
fail. Providing multiple fault information is a useful capability, even if the fault was a
single one. Even diagnosing multiple faults when only one occurred may still generate
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appropriate responses.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
In this thesis, we have presented an approach to robust operative diagnosis of physical
systems. In this chapter, we briefly summarize the contributions of the research and
remaining open research questions.
7.1 Contributions
This thesis described and demonstrated a view of robust problem solving, especially
graceful degradation, as reasoning at higher levels of abstraction (less detail) whenever
the more detailed levels prove to be incomplete or inadequate. A form of abstraction
was defined that applies this view to the problem of diagnosis. This form of abstrac-
tion, named status abstraction, represents the abstraction of the operational status of
components in the physical system. We defined two levels of status abstraction. At the
higher level, we presented a graph representation that describes the real-world physical
system. We demonstrated an incremental, constructive approach to manipulating this
graph representation that supports certain characteristics of operative diagnosis. That
is, we showed the suitability of the constructive approach for diagnosing fault propaga-
tion behavior over time, and for sometimes diagnosing systems with feedback. We also
showed a way to represent different semantics in the same type of graph representation
to characterize different types of fault propagation behavior (physical and functional,
and their combination). We demonstrated an approach that treats these different be-
haviors as different fault classes, and our approach moves to other classes when previous
classes fail to generate suitable hypotheses.
Each of these contributions is described below, beginning with a description of the
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problemof operative diagnosis.
7.1.1 Operative Diagnosis
Operative diagnosis, or diagnosis of physical systems in operation, differs from diagnosis
of non-operating systems (such as maintenance diagnostics) in the following ways: the
information a hypothesis must contain, dynamic fault propagation behavior, and lim-
ited testing for additional information. In operative diagnosis, the diagnosis is done to
facilitate continued operation of the system under consideration. In maintenance diag-
nosis, however, the purpose is to determine which part to fix or replace. This distinction
changes the information that a hypothesis must contain. In operative diagnosis, the
symptoms or effects of the fault often must be treated in addition to the initial failure,
so knowing the source of the fault alone is not always enough. To facilitate continued,
safe operation of the device, the diagnosis must identify the cause and the effects of
the fault. These effects, or system status, must include dependent failures and must
identify components which are working properly but are receiving incorrect inputs.
In an operating physical system, the effect of the fault propagates and the set of
symptoms may change as time (and the fault) progresses. This reflects the characteristic
of non-zero-time propagation, where not all effects of a fault happen immediately. In
operative diagnosis, the propagation often will still be occurring while the diagnosis
is performed. In maintenance, the diagnosis is usually done after all propagation has
taken place.
7.1.2 Robustness
Robustness in problem solving process is a capability that humans exhibit, and a highly
desirable one for knowledge-based systems to exhibit. This thesis described an approach
to improving robustness, particularly graceful degradation, in knowledge-based diagno-
sis through status abstraction.
This research presented and demonstrated the idea that graceful degradation can
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be achieved in a structured way by using abstraction. The basic idea is that graceful
degradation is not achieved by simply exploring whether something is known about
faults, but at what level of detail is it known. Knowledge at different levels of specificity
can provide different fault coverage. Increasing fault coverage is achieved at the cost of
degrading specificity.
For diagnosis, status abstraction of hypotheses is particularly useful when correc-
tive actions are associated with the general fault categories represented by the abstract
hypotheses. However, even when these corrective actions are absent, the localization of
the fault is still useful. Thus, the approach of using different status abstraction levels
for diagnosing novel faults is appropriate when specific hypotheses are most desirable,
but abstract hypotheses are better than nothing. Moreover, some known faults (such
as physical damage) are more appropriately represented at the higher level of abstrac-
tion. This is the case when more specific hypotheses do not improve ability to take
remedial action or the increase in number of specific hypotheses would inhibit their
timely retrieval. The key to success is using a type of abstraction where the higher
level information has some utility.
7.1.3 Incremental Hypothesis Construction
At the higher level of status abstraction, we presented a graph-based representation that
describes the real-world physical system. The representation is particularly important
because it supports reasoning about very complex physical system in a fairly simple
way. The representation captures important characteristics about the physical system
(i.e., fault propagation paths), that enable the diagnostic reasoning to be useful. To
use this representation, we presented and demonstrated an incremental, constructive
approach to producing fault hypotheses by simulating fault propagation behavior. This
fault propagation behavior can be used to discriminate hypotheses, particularly when
symptoms change over time. However, this means that it is desirable for the detection
process to identify when sensor readings become abnormal, not just when they exceed
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the normal operating range. This incremental construction process is important for
efficiently reasoning about new symptoms that arrive as the fault continues to propa-
gate, since it is desirable to build on computations done in previous time steps. We
demonstrated this approach for operative fault diagnosis.
7.1.4 Using Multiple Models
Efficient reasoning with multiple models to explain complex fault behavior is a contri-
bution of this research. The mechanism for using functional and physical models that
are represented in the same graph representation is hypothesis composition, which is
also a constructive process. Individual hypotheses that explain a portion of the fault
propagation within a single model are composed in an efficient manner to explain to-
tal behavior. It is efficient because it builds on previously-created hypotheses and the
composition process uses heuristics about physically realizable combinations to reduce
search.
The constructive nature of the diagnostic reasoning is particularly useful for opera-
tive diagnosis in the chosen domain. In general, the constructive approach is appropriate
when the problem solving must be done often, but the solutions are not that different.
This occurs in cases such as operative diagnosis, because the time-varying nature of
fault propagation means that the hypotheses for two consecutive time snapshots often
will only differ by the amount of additional abnormal behavior caused by the fault.
Formulating a problem as a constructive problem solving task is more appropriate
when the pre-enumerated solutions have much redundant information in them, and a
single theory exists from which these solutions could be constructed (e.g., a model).
Also, a constructive approach is better when a desired hypothesis comes from multiple
sources of knowledge. An example of this is the hypothesis composition in Draphys.
Neither model of the device is sufficient to provide an explanation of all the faulted
system behavior, but the use of two models and heuristics to describe the type of
interaction between them is enough to explain many fault situations.
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Weidentified some knowledge engineering guidelines for these models. These guide-
lines have implications for sensor placement, and are intended to be useful in the design
of new physical systems.
7.1.5 Fault Classes
We showed that fault classes can be defined by level of abstraction and by knowledge
about fault propagation behavior. We defined four single-fault classes: (1) specific,
functionally propagating faults (this class is the one in which Draphys groups known
faults in fault-symptom associations); (2) abstract, functional-propagation faults; (3)
abstract, physical-propagation faults; (4) abstract, hybrid-propagation faults (these
hypotheses include both physical and functional propagation). Each of these classes is
explored in turn when the previous ones fall to diagnose the current symptoms. Davis
defined the notion of adjacency as a means of defining fault classes; we extend that
adding abstraction level to the definition of a fault class. These fault classes partition
the hypothesis space into subspaces, and supports a structured way of retreating from
subspace to subspace when assumptions associated with prior spaces are shown to be
wrong. This approach supports efficient and rational management of the hypothesis
space. In short, we treat diagnosis as searching a space of spaces.
We:consider this partitioning of the hypothesis space to be a taxonomy for diag-
nostic problem solving, since it associates assumptions about the fault behavior with
the appropriate diagnostic problem solving techniques and physical system models.
The taxonomy that is implemented in Draphys is not exhaustive, but does provide a
framework for integrating new problem solving techniques into the overall diagnostic
process.
The partitioning process is applicable to more than diagnosis. Dividing the search
space into classes that require different problem solving techniques and models is a
foundation for an intelligent problem solver.
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7.2 Open Problems
Several open research issues remain. Some were previously existing research issues; some
arose as a result of this research. We present them in the following order: limitations
within the approach itself; fault classes not included here; and other remaining issues.
7.2.1 Limitations Within the Approach
Within the diagnostic approach there are open research issues associated with the two
levels of abstractions in Draphys. Associated with the specific abstraction level, we have
the issues of temporal grain, causal reasoning, extent of propagation, and identifying the
level of fault severity. Associated with both abstraction levels, the issues include rea-
soning with uncertainty, temporal duration, testing for additional information, control
of the diagnostic process, and fault masking.
Temporal Grain
The issue of temporal grain is somewhat subtle. As it currently exists, the associa-
tional reasoning in Draphys is based on the diagnostic reasoning described by domain
experts, who were predominantly pilots. The pilots monitor the aircraft systems based
on sensor information presented on the gauges and dials available in the cockpit, in a
manner very similar to operators of other complex process control systems. Therefore,
the monitoring of the sensors is dependent on the resolution of those gauges and dials.
Because the resolution of these devices is not great, the pilots cannot see small dis-
tinctions on the guage, it takes them too much time, or it is too hard to do. Because
of these human perceptual limitations, they do not depend on instantaneous detection
of aberrant measurements, or transient measurements. Instead, they reason about be-
havior over time periods that may be short but are not instantaneous. They seem to
ignore transients and only reason about steady state behavior over a period of time,
albeit a short period. However, the symptoms generated by the fault monitor for input
to Draphys are instantaneous. Thus Draphys has more detailed information about the
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fault's symptomsthan the expert pilots can provide. It is desirable to take advantage
of these more detailed symptoms, and an open issue is how to acquire knowledge to do
SO.
Causal Reasoning at the Specific Status Abstraction Level
Since the specific level of abstraction reasons about specific malfunctions of particular
components, there is a need to reason about how one of the malfunctions may cause
another. Although one initial malfunction occurred, the propagation of its effects may
cause another malfunction. To explain the fault's behavior at the specific level, knowl-
edge of the causal relationships among malfunctions is desirable. Draphys does not
currently contain such knowledge.
Levels of Severity
One type of information that Draphys does not provide is an indication of the level
of severity of the fault's effect on the component. For example, we might describe
an eroded compressor blade. It is desirable to describe the compressor's operational
status as, for example, "operating but at a degraded level." (Another operational status
might be "totally nonoperational.') Whether the fault severity levels are provided to the
human operating the physical system would be determined by the human's information
requirements in performing the diagnostic task.
Reasoning With Uncertainty
The current implementation does not include any explicit reasoning with uncertainty
(other than the ordering of the fault classes). Therefore, individual hypotheses cannot
be ordered or ranked according to their likelihood compared with other hypotheses
within a fault class. It may be challenging to include reasoning with uncertainty because
of the dynamic behavior and because the likelihood of a particular hypothesis is context
dependent. An example of the former is, when new symptoms are detected that are
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consistent with a current hypotheses, how do we update the certainty of that hypothesis
to reflect this? The latter concern can be illustrated by the example of bird ingestion.
This hypothesis is quite likely if the aircraft is taking off, but is highly unlikely if the
aircraft is cruising at 30,000 feet. Current technology for reasoning with uncertainty
has not yet been applied in Draphys.
Temporal Duration
At present, Draphys does not represent the temporal duration of symptoms in its knowl-
edge. Given two faults with the same initial symptoms, the length of time that the
symptoms last may allow elimination of one of the hypotheses. However, inclusion of
this information in either the fault-symptom associations or the models would be diffi-
cult, for several reasons. First, the knowledge of the symptom duration would have to
describe a range of time, because the duration of a particular symptom will probably
vary, depending on factors such as the severity of the fault, Moreover, this type of du-
ration information may be very difficult to obtain. Currently the duration of symptoms
is ignored in both the abstraction levels, and only the temporal relationships among
entire symptom intervals are used in the diagnostic reasoning. Merely the existence
of new symptoms is used to prune hypotheses, although the lack of symptoms could
potentially be used as well. To perform the latter, however, the diagnostic reasoning
would need to know how long to wait before pruning a hypothesis whose expected future
symptoms did not occur.
Testing for Additional Information
We mentioned earlier that one of the constraints on operative diagnosis is limited test-
ing. However, we can still do some testing. We can use the dynamic response of the
device to the operator's control inputs as additional information for diagnosis. For ex-
ample, the pilot could move the throttle to distinguish between a fan fault and an N1
sensor failure. Similarly, if we suspect a pump failure in the fuel system which has two
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pumps in line, we could turn one off to isolate the faulty pump.
This is a desirable capability for the diagnosis system to have, and it would represent
a significant enhancement. Research on incorporating actions into qualitative reasoning
is being explored [21].
Control of the Diagnostic Process
Control of the diagnostic process is done implicitly in Draphys. A more opportunistic
approach may be beneficial. If we were to incorporate an opportunistic control mecha-
nism, we would have to consider several control issues. These include initiation of the
diagnostic process, moving between levels and types of abstraction, and changing the
fault class under consideration.
The diagnostic process is initiated whenever the fault monitor detects symptoms, or
the symptoms change. This assumes that the symptom appearance triggers the need for
a diagnosis. However, if we have several competing hypotheses, the lack of symptoms
may be as important to the hypothesis pruning process as their presence.
At present, Draphys moves from the specific status abstraction level to the higher
level when the specific level cannot produce a hypothesis. This reflects the diagnos-
tic reasoning described by the human experts. However, reversing the order in which
abstraction levels are explored may have advantages. Determining when to change lev-
els of abstraction and which direction to move are open research questions. Similarly,
moving between abstractions is another issue. The component hierarchies represent a
type of structural abstraction based on aggregating components according to functional
or physical groupings. The status abstraction used for hypothesis construction is an-
other. Coordination between these two types of abstraction and moving among levels
are major open control research issues. Moving between fault classes, and making and
retracting the assumptions associated with each, are also control issues that are still
open questions.
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Fault Masking
One assumption made in the design of Draphys was that we could detect when sensor
readings are abnormal. If this assumption is violated, then faults are masked, because
Draphys would not identify a component as abnormal unless some abnormal sensor
reading gave evidence to that belief.
7.2.2 Other Fault Classes
The fault classes as defined in this thesis are not exhaustive, but the diagnosis taxonomy
in which they are organized does provide a framework for integrating new fault classes.
For example, we assumed that the there were no intermittent faults, which may define a
subclass under one of the existing classes (e.g., abstract functional propagation faults).
Intermittent Faults
There are several types of intermittency. This term is used to describe faults that occur
only under certain circumstances, in which it is often necessary to determine what those
circumstances are in order to diagnose the fault. The term is also used to describe faults
that only appear occasionally, even under the same set of circumstances; e.g., a loose
connection. "Intermittent fault" might also be used to describe a malfunction that
occurs, then the device returns to normal operation after some action or occurrence
takes place, e.g., some corrective action by the operator.
Each one of these types ofintermittency must be diagnosed differently. Draphys does
not currently handle any type of intermittent fault; indeed, the incremental updating
of hypotheses assumes that previously abnormal components remain abnormal. The
reasoning process would have to be modified to accommodate such fault behavior.
Violated Directionality
Draphys currently assumes that the directionality modeled in the physical system mod-
els are correct. If this directionality is violated, the models cannot be used to simulate
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thefault propagationbehavior.Adding a fault class that looks for such occurrences is
possible, although the search process would be extensive. This is a particularly difficult
issue for that reason. In the domain of aircraft subsystems, we did not encounter any
accident or incident cases where this directionality assumption was violated. In other
domains, it may be a more critical issue.
Design Errors and Design Knowledge
Design errors are another fault class that Draphys is not designed to diagnose. We
assume that the design of the device is correct, in that it satisfies the requirements it
is supposed to satisfy. If the design is not correct, but we have design models that
accurately reflect that design, we would never detect that an error had occurred in the
case where the system did not satisfy its design requirements. Similarly, we would not
be able to detect an operator error, because the monitor only detects abnormalities
compared with the operator inputs and the current conditions.
We also assume that our design knowledge, in the physical system models, is correct.
There is no mechanism in Draphys to overcome modeling inaccuracies, although the
fault monitor does have some tolerance for slight numerical inaccuracies.
7.2.3 Other Research Issues
Operator Actions
Draphy.s does not explicitly reason about actions taken by the human operator to
recover from the fault. Since the fault monitor identifies sensor readings as symptomatic
compared with their expected value based on operator input, the only circumstances
that would invalidate the diagnostic reasoning at the abstract level would be if the
operator action corrected the problem, and the abnormal sensor readings returned to
normal. This would affect the diagnostic reasoning because it violates the assumption
that abnormal components remain abnormal. Therefore, relaxing the assumption to
provide reasoning about such circumstances would be a useful extension.
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At the specific level, however, the operator actions have more impact. The specific
associational rules assume no operator actions. Thus, reasoning about operator actions
would be even more useful at this level to accommodate situations that we can expect
to occur. Moreover, if we recommend corrective actions and the operator performs
them, we need to monitor their effectiveness.
Determining Corrective Actions - Recovery Planning
Before this diagnostic approach can be useful in an operational environment, it should
be coupled with a process that takes the diagnostic information and determines the ap-
propriate corrective actions. These must include both short-term actions, and long-term
actions. In the aircraft domain, the short-term actions correspond to the immediate
control inputs made to stabilize or minimize the fault's effects. The long-term action
might be to modify the flight plan to accommodate the reduced functionality of the
airplane, possibly including a new destination.
Short-term actions will be generally be procedures that the operator should follow.
Some of the issues that will arise include: combining procedures necessary for separate
malfunctions, or for different subsystems; constructing procedures for novel faults, and
monitoring the execution of these procedures for effectiveness.
User Interfaces
Because there is a human operator involved, the presentation of diagnostic information
in an effective, comprehensible form must be done. The information should include
the hypotheses, system status, and potentially an explanation of the diagnostic pro-
cess. However, presentation of this information raises many human factors issues than
cannot be ignored if we are to achieve an effective total human/machine system. The
presentation media (e.g., voice output, CRT display) and the presentation format (e.g.,
pictures versus text) are critical issues.
Another aspect of the user interface is to solicit information from the operator.
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Humans have sensors that the diagnostic system cannot use. The human can hear
and see things, thereby obtaining data unavailable otherwise. How does the diagnostic
reasoning solicit and use this information? The interaction between the two involves
several human factors issues. Does the operator enter the information via voice input?
Other possibilities include keyboard and touch panel. How the diagnostic system queries
the operator involves similar questions.
7.3 Human/Machine Performance
We come to one final issue. Why do we want to automate the type of reasoning
explored in this thesis? One of our long-term goals is to maximize performance of
the human/machine system as a total system. This brings up some conflicting issues
in building an intelligent problem solver (IPS) on a computer. On the one hand, we
would like our IPS to be consistent with human cognitive processes, to facilitate the
communication between them. However, we do not want to restrict ourselves to human
reasoning. We should intentionally design our system to help overcome the limitations
of the human. If this is true, then modeling an expert might not be appropriate. In the
diagnosis process, diagnosing physical propagation is an example of such a limitation.
Apparently humans have difficulty identifying the physical damage that a fault can
cause. Yet, we want to have the diagnosis system communicate the reasoning in a
manner that is comprehensible to the human. An automated diagnostic system such
as Draphys has the potential to augment the human and improve human/machine
performance.
7.4 Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, we have explored two ideas for increasing robust diagnosis of physical
systems in operation: the use of status abstraction and definition of fault classes based
on abstraction level and fault propagation behavior. This definition of the fault classes
partitions the hypothesis space into subspaces, and provides a structured way of falling
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backfrom one subspace to another when the fault cannot be diagnosed. We order the
processing of subspaces based on likelihood, and less likely fault classes are not explored
if more likely fault classes can account for the fault. We explored two additional ideas for
efficiently managing the hypothesis space. The first is incremental hypothesis construc-
tion, which takes advantage of previously computed hypotheses when new symptoms
appear. The second is the use of hypothesis composition when multiple physical-system
models are needed to explain complex fault behavior. These ideas were implemented
and demonstrated for operative diagnosis of aircraft subsystems. We discussed their
advantages and limitations, and open research issues.
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